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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON BANKING
Eric Moore
Santosh Anagol
In the first chapter, I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to study the
impact of auction-based emergency liquidity at the onset of the 2007-09 crisis. My
empirical design uses the presence of binding auction capacity constraints to isolate
variation in short-term borrowing from the Federal Reserve. I find that the growth in
marginal winners’ outstanding loan commitments is about 15% higher than marginal
losers. This eﬀect stems through more lending: marginal winners’ loan growth was
about 8% higher than that of marginal losers. These eﬀects arise despite the ability
to replicate this auction-based liquidity’s funding structure through the discount window. They highlight that banks would have relied considerably less on the Federal
Reserve had only the discount window been in place during the crisis. I discuss the
role of discount window stigma in partly explaining these results.
In the second chapter, I study the relationship between confidentiality and contract
enforcement. I specifically examine whether publicly exposing past-due borrowers
increases their lenders’ propensity to seek loan recovery through the legal system. I
explore this question in the context of a large rise in past-due loans within India’s
government-owned banks, which led a bank employees’ association to disclose the
largest defaulters’ identities and loan amounts. Overall, this group increased the
probability of legal enforcement by about 10%, with most of this eﬀect arising from
their initial threat to expose these defaulters. Lenders targeted past-due borrowers
that could likely have avoided default, which is consistent with a desire to reduce the
perception of corruption that might follow from disclosure.
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Chapter 1: Auction-Based Liquidity of Last Resort
Eric Moore
Abstract
I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to study the impact of auction-based
emergency liquidity at the onset of the 2007-09 crisis. My empirical design uses
the presence of binding capacity constraints in the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction
Facility to isolate variation in short-term borrowing through this program. I find that
the growth in marginal winners’ outstanding loan commitments is about 15% higher
than marginal losers. This eﬀect stems through more lending: marginal winners’ loan
growth was about 8% higher than that of marginal losers. These eﬀects arise despite
the ability to replicate this auction-based liquidity’s funding structure through the
discount window. They highlight that banks would have relied considerably less on
the Federal Reserve had only the discount window been in place during the crisis. I
discuss the role of discount window stigma in partly explaining these results.

1

1.1 Introduction
Inter-bank lending markets help ensure an eﬃcient allocation of capital in the
banking system. While these markets facilitate re-allocating surplus liquidity in normal times, potential lenders may hoard liquidity during a financial crisis and, thereby,
force banks in need of funding to cut lending. Central banks should provide liquidity
in such circumstances, but banks may under-utilize such funding as their borrowing, if discovered by market participants, could provide a negative signal about their
credit-worthiness. In light of these concerns, one approach taken during the crisis was
to adjust how short-term funding was provided directly to banks. One of the Federal
Reserve’s early responses to the 2007-09 crisis was to create auctions for emergency
liquidity. This raises a simple question: How much does the nature of emergency
liquidity matter?
This question is challenging to answer for two reasons. First, it is diﬃcult to find a
valid counterfactual for banks that utilize emergency funding. These banks are likely
to diﬀer along unobservable dimensions, implying that a regression of bank lending
on emergency liquidity suﬀers from an omitted-variable bias. Second, assuming this
challenge were overcome, one would still need to contrast the eﬀect of one approach
relative to a close, but distinct, alternative to highlight how much that funding’s
characteristics ultimately mattered.
Quantifying the impact of diﬀerent ways to provide short-term loans is important
given the key role that such changes played in the early response to the 2007-09 financial crisis. In 2007, for example, the Federal Reserve established the Term Auction
Facility, an auction-based approach to granting short-term funding to banks that substituted for pre-existing funding available through the discount window. With over
$3.8 trillion in Term Auction Facility loans granted, this program was an apparent
success at encouraging banks to borrow, but its impact on bank lending is unclear.
2

Much of this borrowing might have occurred with only the discount window in place
during the crisis. Banks can also hoard liquidity, suggesting that banks might borrow
but not expand credit to borrowers.1
I propose an empirical strategy to estimate the impact of the Term Auction Facility that utilizes the presence of binding capacity constraints in these auctions.
Specifically, I leverage over $600 billion in loan requests that were not granted by
comparing the outcomes of banks with bids placed close to, but on either side of the
market-clearing interest rate in each auction. As most marginal losers pursue funding again through future auctions, I use failure to obtain funding in a given auction
as an instrument for future borrowing in the same quarter within a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design.
I focus on the impact on banks’ outstanding loan commitments. Loan commitments are contractual obligations to provide funding. They are an important source
of liquidity and play a key role in our understanding of banks. In the seminal model
of Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002), banks provide liquidity to borrowers through
loan commitments. In providing this liquidity, banks must hold liquid assets to help
fund unpredictable drawdowns. Liquidity pressures can thus damage banks’ ability
to commit new funding to borrowers. As loan commitments account for around 80
percent of all commercial and industrial loans alone, they are a key channel through
which illiquidity can aﬀect the economy.2
Outstanding commitments specifically measure the “unused” component of banks’
loan commitments. Defined in this manner, this variable will increase if banks grant
more loans but also if borrowers arrest drawdowns on pre-existing lines of credit. I
find that Term Auction Facility funding increased the growth in outstanding com1

A variety of models of the inter-bank market can feature banks hoarding liquidity in equilibrium.
For example, see Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) and Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2015).
Freixas and Jorge (2008) provide a model of the interbank market with credit rationing.
2
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/200712/e2.pdf
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mitments: this growth rate was 15% larger for marginal winners than marginal losers
when considering banks’ whose highest bid fell within the vicinity of the marketclearing interest rate.3 This result i) is not present prior to the establishment of the
Term Auction Facility, ii) is robust to diﬀerent bandwidth and polynomial choices and
iii) is not explained by discontinuous changes in bank characteristics at the marketclearing interest rate.
This result alone illustrates that auction-based liquidity through the Term Auction
Facility was important despite the co-existence of discount window funding. It does
not, however, indicate specifically whether the eﬀect comes from more lending or
reduced drawdowns on pre-existing commitments. One can gauge which is at work
by looking at a comprehensive credit growth measure that includes on-balance sheet
loans and oﬀ-balance sheet commitments. This outcome would move in response to
loan supply changes, but not from borrowers’ drawdowns. Consistent with a loan
supply interpretation, the growth in this comprehensive measure was about 6-8%
higher for marginal winners relative to marginal losers.
Understanding why this result exists is important considering there is a proposal
in the U.S. Congress that would require the Federal Reserve to immediately disclose
its borrowers’ solvency.4 Bernanke (2015) highlights that this could eliminate the
Federal Reserve’s ability to provide emergency liquidity by making banks become
unwilling to borrow from the Federal Reserve altogether, i.e. the stigma problem.
While the existence of this stigma is well-established, e.g. see Armantier et al. (2015),
its broader consequences are largely unknown.
Stigma might explain my results as all Term Auction Facility bidders could borrow
at the Federal Reserve’s discount window, which grants similar loans on a no questions
3

Section 1.3.1 discusses why I focus on banks’ highest bids.
The specific legislative proposal is S. 1320, also called the “Bailout Prevention Act of 2015”
(Congress (2015)). It was introduced into the Senate on May 13th, 2015 by Senators Elizabeth
Warren (D-Massachusetts) and David Vitter (R-Louisiana).
4

4

asked basis. If a bank fails to receive a Term Auction Facility loan, it can often
replicate the same funding structure through the discount window.5 Diﬀerences in
outcomes between marginal winners and losers suggest a stigma-based explanation,
but they might also arise as Term Auction Facility loans were at times less expensive
than the discount window. Which mechanism is at work provides insight into the
consequences of requiring the Federal Reserve to disclose its borrowers’ solvency.
To test the stigma-based explanation, I examine the lending eﬀect in the subsample where the auctions were more expensive than the discount window. During
these auctions, a bank whose bid was marginally below the auction’s market-clearing
rate could have immediately borrowed at the discount window at a relatively lower
interest rate. Should the lending eﬀect arise in this sub-sample, then a stigma-based
explanation is merited. Conversely, when the market-clearing interest rate in the
auction is below the discount window rate, banks might lend more because they have
access to a cheaper funding source.
I show that my main result is similar in magnitude in this sub-sample. This
suggests that some banks may have placed a bid above the discount window rate
that fell below the auction market clearing rate ex post, but were not willing to
subsequently replicate their loan request through the discount window. In eﬀect,
it suggests that banks were willing to take loans through the auctions that they
were not willing to take through the discount window simply because of stigma.6
Auction-based liquidity appears, in part, to stimulate borrowing that would never
5

My sample includes the 21 capacity constrained auctions where a borrower could essentially
replicate the Term Auction Facility funding structure at the discount window. The other two of
the 23 auctions with a binding capacity constraint granted 84-day maturity loans and so a borrower
could not fully replicate the Term Auction Facility funding at the discount window owing to the
latter’s maximum borrowing period of 30 days.
6
The challenge in knowing with certainty whether this is due to stigma is that I am unable to
observe the specific interest that the bank included as part of its loan request. As long as marginal
losers’ loan requests were above the discount window rate, then any subsequent diﬀerence in lending
between marginal winners and losers must be due to stigma. This follows from the fact that loans
through the discount window and the Term Auction Facility shared several characteristics, with the
other characteristics weakly favoring discount window loans.

5

have occurred provided the Federal Reserve had only relied on the discount window.
My results relate to several areas of the literature. First, they connect to the
literature on bank liquidity shocks and the corresponding central bank interventions
designed to resolve them. Liquidity shocks can lead to asset fire sales and reduce
lending. Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), and Schnabl (2012) show that
such shocks reduce firms’ access to credit. Negative real eﬀects can also result when
borrowers are unable to compensate for the decline in credit (e.g., Chodorow-Reich
(2014); Benmelech, Meisenzahl, and Ramcharan (2016)). Liquidity shocks can also
have first-order impacts on real outcomes due to financial frictions in credit markets.
Deteriorating financial conditions of some borrowers lead to fire sales, which create
externalities that decrease other firms’ net worth and, thereby, exacerbate agency
problems and contractions in credit (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Bernanke and
Gertler (1989)).
Central banks should thus combat illiquidity. My paper relates to the empirical
literature on these interventions (e.g., see Richardson and Troost (2009); Carlson,
Mitchener, and Richardson (2011); Duygan-Bump et al. (2013), among others). Relative to the existing literature, I provide a new empirical strategy to estimate the
eﬀect of one of the largest emergency lending programs during the crisis. By focusing
on loan commitments specifically, I connect emergency funding to a key function of
banks: the provision of liquidity on demand as in Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002).
My paper resolves part of the conflict in the literature regarding the Term Auction
Facility’s eﬀectiveness. Berger et al. (2015) and Wu (2015), for example, conflict on
the importance of the Term Auction Facility in increasing bank lending.7 My paper,
therefore, adds to our understanding of the determinants of bank lending during the
crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010); Cornett et al. (2011)).
7

There is also a related debate about whether the Term Auction Facility reduced inter-bank
borrowing rates (e.g., see Taylor and Williams (2007), Wu (2011), and McAndrews, Sarkar, and
Wang (2015)).
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A unique feature of my setting is that banks that were eligible for Term Auction
Facility funding also had pre-existing access to similar loans at the discount window.
As such, my results speak more to the impact of the nature of how emergency liquidity is provided than the liquidity itself. The lending eﬀect that I identify arguably
captures the marginal eﬀect of auction-based liquidity on loan commitments relative
to the amount of lending that would have occurred with only the discount window in
place during the same period of the crisis. There is convincing evidence that discount
window stigma exists, but the broader consequences of stigma have remained largely
unknown. My results suggest that stigma may influence credit during a crisis.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of liquidity
provision by the Federal Reserve. Section 1.3 introduces my research design and data.
Section 1.4 provides the main results. Section 1.5 discusses the findings.

1.2 Liquidity Provision by the Federal Reserve
In normal times, banks can obtain short-term loans through inter-bank lending
markets. These markets reallocate banks’ surplus liquidity to other banks in need of
funding through unsecured, typically overnight loans or also through secured loans at
longer maturities. While these markets function properly in normal times, banks may
be reluctant to lend to each other during a crisis (Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009);
Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2015); Freixas and Jorge (2008)). Heider, Hoerova,
and Holthausen (2015), for example, show that the banking system can, at times, be
such that only risky banks borrow in the inter-bank market and interest rates are
high, as well as a separate equilibrium featuring a complete market breakdown.
Significant strains of this nature in the inter-bank market suddenly appeared in
mid-2007 amid the ongoing deterioration of the U.S. real estate market. Prior to this
period, inter-bank markets were relatively calm. Nonetheless, the spread between the
LIBOR and Treasury bill rates, as well as other measures of inter-bank market stress,
7

increased dramatically on August 9th, 2007 (Taylor and Williams (2009); Brunnermeier (2009)).8 Figure 1 highlights this dramatic increase. Amid concerns about
banks’ ability to obtain liquidity via inter-bank markets, policymakers took several
steps to encourage borrowing through the discount window. The Federal Reserve
lowered the interest rate, expanded acceptable collateral, and increased the maturity
of discount window loans (Brunnermeier (2009)). The lack of a major response to
these changes led the Federal Reserve to consider a novel approach to providing access
to short-term loans: establishing auctions for short-term liquidity.

1.2.1 Term Auction Facility
The Term Auction Facility provided short-term funding to banks through sealedbid, uniform price auctions. The auctions primarily granted 28- or 84-day loans to
banks with access to the discount window’s primary credit program.9 It was first
announced on December 12th, 2007. The first auction occurred on December 17th,
2007. A total of 60 auctions were conducted. The last auction was held on March
8th, 2010, with this auction’s loans maturing on April 8th, 2010. The Term Auction
Facility provided over $3.8 trillion in loans, with over half of the funds going to foreign
banks (e.g., see Benmelech (2012)). Following the first auction for $20 billion, auction
sizes increased up to $150 billion in October 2010.
The presence of binding capacity constraints in many of these auctions underlies
my empirical design. Figure 2 illustrates these constraints. The blue line plots the
total value of loans requested beyond the auction capacity. There was over $40
billion in unmet loan requests, for example, in the first auction due to this capacity
constraint. Over the next several auctions, the capacity initially increased to $30
8

Several explanations for this large increase in inter-bank spreads have been proposed, including
both an increase in counter-party risk and liquidity premiums (Taylor and Williams (2009)).
9
Section 1.3.1 discusses the equilibrium bidding strategy in these auctions and highlights its
relevance for my empirical design. For more information about the Term Auction Facility generally,
see https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm

8

billion and then to $50 billion. Unmet loan requests remained high at around $31
billion, on average, during the first ten auctions. The capacity was further increased
following this period to $75 billion and unmet loan requests in the subsequent ten
auctions decreased slightly to around $18 billion. Binding capacity constraints were
present in the first 23 auctions, with a total of over $600 billion in unmet loan requests.
My sample consists of the 21 oversubscribed auctions that granted either 28- or 35day maturity loans. Table 1 summarizes these auctions. The average over-subscribed
auction had 74 bidders and slightly more than 45 bidders that received funding. The
average auction granted $53 billion in loans with more than $27 billion in unmet
loan requests. These 21 auctions granted 959 loans, with an average size of over $1.1
billion. There was also considerable heterogeneity in the amount of funding requested:
the largest loan was for $7.5 billion and the smallest for slightly more than $1 million.
The median loan size was $500 million.
Table 2 summarizes the commercial banks that bid in any of these auctions. It
measures characteristics in 2007Q3, which is the quarter prior to the establishment
of the Term Auction Facility. The average bidder had approximately $67 billion in
assets. There was substantial heterogeneity in size: the largest bank had almost $2
trillion in assets and the smallest had only $100 million. The median bank had almost
$10 billion in assets. The average bank also held three percent of its assets in cash, six
percent in mortgage-backed securities, and 31 percent of its assets were loans secured
by real estate. As others have highlighted, e.g. Benmelech (2012), foreign banks
played an important role in this setting. Approximately, 39 percent of commercial
bank bidders in the oversubscribed auctions were foreign.
A typical auction proceeded as follows. The Federal Reserve would initially determine the quantity of funds to provide through the auction and then announce this
figure publicly along with the auction parameters. Banks could submit up to two
bids in the auction, with each bid consisting of two components: an interest rate and
9

a loan amount.10 The interest rate must be at least the overnight indexed swap rate.
The loan amount requested needed to exceed $10 million initially, but this amount
decreased to $5 million in February of 2008 (Armantier and Sporn (2015)). Banks
could borrow up to ten percent of the auction capacity.
Once bidding was completed, the allocation of loans was based primarily on the
interest rate component of banks’ bids. Bids with the highest interest rate were
initially accepted, with the Federal Reserve then accepting bids with lower interest
rates until the auction capacity was, if at all, exhausted. Bids above the marketclearing interest rate, i.e. the stop-out rate, were granted the entire loan amount
requested. Bids placed below this rate were not granted a loan. All banks paid the
same interest rate, namely the market-clearing rate. If a bank failed to receive funding
through the auction, it had three main options: seek funding elsewhere, bid in future
auctions, or borrow through the discount window.

1.2.2 The Discount Window
The discount window is the traditional tool used by the Federal Reserve to supply liquidity to banks facing funding problems.11 It operates under three diﬀerent
facilities: the primary, secondary, and seasonal credit programs. The discount window’s broad objective is liquidity provision, but each program caters to a diﬀerent
set of banks. The primary credit program helps relieve liquidity strains by providing
short-term credit to healthy banks, but it also complements monetary policy implementation by providing a ceiling on the actual federal funds rate. The secondary
credit program is for less healthy banks. It provides loans at higher rates and with
more restrictions than the primary credit program. The seasonal credit program sup10

Bank holding companies could submit more bids by virtue of owning multiple banks that were
individually eligible to place bids.
11
This section draws from the Federal Reserve’s discount window website: https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org.
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plies liquidity to smaller banks that are exposed to significant seasonal fluctuations.
Nonetheless, the remaining discussion highlights the primary credit program as it
accounts for most discount window borrowing and would be the main substitute for
Term Auction Facility loans.
Discount window eligibility is based on several considerations. The primary determinant of eligibility is maintaining reserves at the Federal Reserve. This applies to
foreign, as well as, domestic banks. It also applies to other institutions that hold reserves at the Federal Reserve despite not being legally required to do so, e.g. bankers’
banks and corporate credit unions. Eligibility to borrow, broadly speaking, does not
immediately imply access to the primary credit program. Banks must also be in good
financial condition to borrow through the primary credit program. Good financial
condition is typically defined by a CAMELS rating of one, two, or three but other
supervisory information may also influence this determination.12
Banks must pledge collateral to secure any discount window loans. A variety of
assets are accepted by the Federal Reserve. Some common assets used as collateral
include U.S. Treasury obligations, commercial and residential loans, and corporate
bonds, among others. The lendable value of any given collateral is determined by the
prevailing margins set by the Federal Reserve, which vary across asset types, maturity,
and other factors. The interest rate on discount window loans is determined, at a
minimum, bi-weekly by each Federal Reserve bank and is applicable to banks located
in each respective district. In practice, however, the rates are essentially the same
across districts.13 Prior to the crisis, the primary credit rate was 100 basis points
12

CAMELS refers to the diﬀerent elements of banks’ financial condition that are assessed: capital
adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity (Lopez (1999)). Other information
may indicate that a bank with a CAMELS rating of one, two, or three is not in good financial
condition and, therefore, is not eligible for discount window loans. A bank with a CAMELS rating
of four, which would normally indicate that the bank was not in good financial condition, can also
be eligible to borrow at the discount window provided other data indicates it is healthy enough.
13
The only real diﬀerence across districts is when the rate is adopted. The various Federal Reserve
districts have historically adopted the same rate, with some minor diﬀerences in the date at which
the new rate commences. The diﬀerences typically manifest as one district adopting the new rate a
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above the federal funds target rate.
The primary credit program provides credit with limited oversight. Primary credit
program loans are, for example, granted on a no questions asked basis to eligible
banks. There are also virtually no restrictions on how the funds are used. This contrasts with the secondary credit program, which requires prospective borrowers to
detail the purpose for their borrowing. The secondary credit program also prohibits
borrowers from using the funds to expand their asset base. The limited administrative oversight and restrictions are designed to make discount borrowing through the
primary credit program attractive to banks.
1.2.2.1 Replicating Term Auction Facility Loans at the Discount Window
The discount window provides, in eﬀect, a way for banks to sometimes replicate
funding that they might otherwise seek through the Term Auction Facility. In my
sample of auctions for 28- or 35-day loans, a bank whose bid failed could eﬀectively
replicate the same loan they sought but did not receive through the Term Auction
Facility.14 A bank that failed to receive an 84-day loan through the Term Auction
Facility, however, would only have a limited ability to replicate that funding structure
at the discount window.
The following example illustrates this comparability. Consider a bank that bid
for a loan through the auction held on August 25th, 2008. This auction provided
$75 billion in 28-day maturity loans. Suppose this bank sought a $1 billion loan at
an interest rate of 2.379%. The following day, on August 26th, the bank would have
learned that its loan request was not accepted. Had the bank received this funding, the
loan would have dispersed on August 28th and matured on September 25th. Despite
its failed loan request, this bank could have requested a discount window loan for $1
day before another district.
14
For the one 35-day auction in my sample, this is not exactly the case. The diﬀerence in maturities
is, however, relatively small being only 5 days.
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billion on August 28th. This loan would have provided funding until September 25th,
thereby producing an identical funding structure to the loan it requested, but failed
to receive, through the Term Auction Facility.15 Common eligibility across these two
programs implies that this option is available to all banks seeking funding through
the Term Auction Facility.
The desirability of switching to the discount window naturally depends on the
characteristics of discount window relative to Term Auction Facility loans. Nonetheless, these borrowing sources share many similarities as the Term Auction Facility
was designed to be an alternative to the discount window. In terms of eligibility,
public disclosure, collateral requirements/haircuts, and loan terms, the two funding
sources are essentially the same. While the maximum loan amount, frequency of borrowing opportunities, loan settlement period, and the ability to prepay diﬀered, the
discount window is better in the sense that it provides banks with more flexibility.
Additionally, in the above example, the bank would have reduced interest expenses
by borrowing at the discount window instead as the stop-out rate was higher than
the discount window rate.16
Despite an ability to replicate Term Auction Facility loans, banks may be reluctant
to use the discount window to resolve funding problems. This possibility, referred to as
the stigma problem, stems from banks’ concern that their borrowing from the Federal
Reserve, should it become publicly known, might send a negative signal about its
health (Armantier et al. (2015)).17 There is a variety of anecdotal evidence regarding
15

In two oversubscribed auctions, namely those for 84-day maturity loans, a bank cannot fully
replicate a Term Auction Facility loan at the discount window. This is due to the maturity of
discount window loans being only for up to 30-days. However, my main results use only the oversubscribed auctions for 28-day or 35-day maturity loans, where banks can basically replicate the
funding structure at the discount window.
16
Prior to the crisis, however, a bank would not have been able to replicate the Term Auction
Facility funding structure in this manner as discount window loans were granted on an overnight
basis. The overnight maturity had already been extended up to 30 days prior to the establishment
of the Term Auction Facility.
17
Ennis and Weinberg (2013) provide a formal model of stigma in the context of the inter-bank
market.
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the existence of stigma. Mishkin (2008), for example, notes that stigma “may largely
account for the extent to which discount window borrowing has generally remained
at moderate levels in recent months.” Bernanke (2009a) also highlights that “banks’
concern was that their recourse to the discount window, if it became known, might
lead market participants to infer weakness.”
While discount window borrowers are not disclosed by policy, the concern is that
extremely large consequences could result from the market learning of a bank’s reliance on government support. Northern Rock, which had short-term funding problems building in mid-2007, provides a good example of the concern that banks are
thought to have in mind. Following failed attempts by regulators to find a buyer for
Northern Rock, the BBC announced on September 13th that the bank had sought
government support. The following day, the Bank of England indicated its intention
to provide emergency liquidity, with a severe bank run by Northern Rock’s retail
depositors immediately following (Shin (2009); Bernanke (2015)).18
Aside from the media, there are other channels through which discount window
borrowers might be identified. For example, large banks may be identified from
weekly aggregate data published by the Federal Reserve or, additionally, through their
participation (or lack thereof) in the inter-bank market (Armantier et al. (2015)).
As I obtained the identities of all Term Auction Facility bidders through a Freedom
of Information Act request, this is also a possible identification channel that banks
could be concerned about.19
Despite a long-standing concern over stigma, direct empirical evidence has long
proved diﬃcult to establish. Some early papers provide evidence that banks appeared
18

While this example highlights a borrower from the Bank of England, it illustrates the disclosure
risk underlying stigma.
19
In particular, I was able to obtain data on the identities of all banks that placed bids through the
Term Auction Facility, even those that never received funding. This includes some banks that are
not found in what are now publicly available disclosures of the Federal Reserve’s borrowers during
the financial crisis.
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willing to pay more to borrow in inter-bank markets when central bank funding
was available at below-market rates (Furfine (2001, 2003)). While these borrowing
patterns could suggest that stigma is real, some believe that the underlying data
itself is problematic. Armantier and Copeland (2015), for example, show that the
underlying algorithm that is used to identify loan transactions in the Federal Reserve’s
Fedwire database produces errors at an alarmingly high rate. Such borrowing patterns
may also reflect outdated features of the discount window - e.g., a requirement that
banks exhaust all private funding sources.20 While there is good evidence of stigma
during the Great Depression, e.g. see Anbil (2015), the discount window is now quite
diﬀerent.
Nonetheless, policymakers were concerned over stigma in the early stages of the
2007-09 financial crisis. To oﬀset stigma’s potential impact, discount window policy
was changed in several ways to encourage banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve.
The spread on discount window loans, for example, was lowered on August 17th,
2007 from 100 to 50 basis points above the federal funds target rate. The maturity of
discount window loans was also extended up to 30 days (Duke (2010); Armantier et
al. (2015)). Despite these changes, discount window borrowing remained essentially
unchanged.21 On December 12th, 2007, the Federal Reserve introduced the Term
Auction Facility as an alternative to the discount window, whose primary goal was
to reduce the stigma and, therefore, to improve the Federal Reserve’s ability to inject
liquidity into the banking system (Bernanke (2009a); Duke (2010)).
The Term Auction Facility’s early popularity suggests that it reduced stigma.
There are several explanations as to why Term Auction loans might have less stigma.
20

For example, banks may appear to pay more in the private market because they are not allowed
to actually borrow at the discount window. For the most part, the discount window as it is described
in this section has been in place since 2003.
21
It should be noted, however, that low levels of discount window borrowing at this time could
also be explained by other liquidity available to banks through the Federal Home Loan Bank System
(FHLB). Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2010) highlight that FHLB advances increased by $235 billion
in the second quarter of 2007 to over $800 billion in total.
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First, by capping how much any bank can borrow, the Federal Reserve ensures that
funds are better distributed across banks. More borrowers overall provide better
anonymity to any given borrower. Second, the three-day delay between auction results
and loan dispersement ensures that borrowers do not have “acute funding needs on
a particular day” (Bernanke (2009a)). Additionally, the auction format may serve a
signaling role that the discount window cannot (La’O (2014)). Following the financial
crisis, Armantier et al. (2015) provided direct evidence that the Term Auction Facility
had less stigma than loans through the discount window.22

1.3 Data & Empirical Design
I employ data on bids placed for funding through the Term Auction Facility. I
obtained this data by personally submitting a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request to the Federal Reserve. The data cover all sixty auctions and contain the
identity of each bidder and the rank of each bid within the auction. While the
underlying bids consist of an interest rate and quantity combination, the full bid
information is protected by confidentiality and I, therefore, work with the limited
sample that only contains bid ranks. I manually merge each bidder by name to its
regulatory identification number with the Federal Reserve (i.e., its RSSD ID).23
The raw bidding data does not indicate which bids were ultimately accepted. To
determine this, I also obtained the rank of the last bid accepted through a separate
FOIA request. I then merge the bids to loan-level data on all Term Auction Facility
loans. While this loan-level data was confidential at the time of my sample, it is now
distributed through the Federal Reserve’s website. To measure bank performance and
other characteristics, I merge the bidding data to bank balance sheet data from the
22

Although they provide convincing evidence of stigma, they do not explore the broader consequences of stigma on bank lending.
23
In a few cases, I could not match the bidder name to a unique RSSD, owing to a general bank
name. I excluded these borrowers from the analysis. The specific banks include: City National
Bank, Colonial Bank, and Guaranty Bank.
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Federal Reserve’s Call & Income report.
Bidders do not necessarily correspond to the top-level of a bank holding company.
I thus measure bank outcomes at the holding company level by using the parents
RSSD ID to aggregate across banks. I reduce the influence of outliers by winsorizing
my outcome variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Overall, observations in my
dataset vary at the bid-level and are measured at the end of the quarter during
which the auction was held. All pre-determined bank characteristics are measured
in 2007Q3, which is the quarter prior to the establishment of the Term Auction
Facility. As foreign banks do not report complete data, I only examine impacts for
U.S. banks.24

1.3.1 Econometric Framework
My empirical design utilizes under-capacity in the early stages of the Term Auction
Facility to isolate exogenous variation in short-term loans from the Federal Reserve.
To evaluate the eﬀect of this funding on bank lending, a simple approach would
compare loan growth for banks that were granted loans relative to those whose bid
failed owing to the auction’s capacity constraint. While intuitive, this approach will
confound the eﬀect of Term Auction loans with other unobserved variables that also
influence bank lending. Potential confounding variables should, however, become
irrelevant as one focuses the comparison on banks that were close to not receiving
funding, but whose bid was accepted, to those banks that were close to receiving
funding, but whose bid failed.
With this intuition in mind, I use variation arising from bids placed around the
market clearing interest rate in each auction. A bid marginally above the marketclearing interest rate, i.e. the stop-out rate, was granted a loan in that auction, but
24

In an extreme case, if foreign banks used the funding to expand lending outside of the U.S.,
then the lack of complete data would artificially create a bias towards a treatment eﬀect of zero.
Shin (2011) highlights the general view that U.S. branches of foreign banks are used to obtain dollar
liquidity that is ultimately distributed to the parents’ home oﬃce abroad.
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a bid marginally below this rate was not. Comparing the raw diﬀerence in average
outcomes on either side of the stop-out rate facilitates a comparison of otherwise similar banks, but it is likely to significantly under-estimate the Term Auction Facility’s
impact. This stems from the implicit assumption made by such a comparison: every
bank whose bid fell below the stop-out rate is completely unaﬀected by the Term
Auction Facility.
Banks can, nonetheless, pursue Term Auction Facility funding in future auctions.
With auctions occurring bi-weekly, it seems likely that many banks whose bid failed
could access funding through future auctions. Section 1.3.1.1 shows this is empirically
relevant, with many marginal losers in a given auction ultimately obtaining funding
through subsequent auctions. Thus, failure in a given auction does not imply a lack
of treatment over longer time horizons, e.g. at the quarterly-level. To isolate the full
treatment eﬀect, the diﬀerence in average outcomes on either side of the stop-out rate
must be scaled by the diﬀerence in the probability of obtaining Term Auction Facility
loans in future auctions (Lee and Lemieux (2010); Hahn, Todd, Van der Klaauw
(2001)).
Consistent with these realities, I estimate the impact of the Term Auction Facility
using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. My empirical specification is given by:

y b,t = ↵1 +

1 QT AFb,t

+ h(Rankb,t ) +

t

+ ✏b,t ,

(1)

where b and t denote a specific bank and auction, respectively. yb,t denotes an outcome variable of bank b for the quarter during which auction t is held, QT AFb,t is
an indicator variable that equals one if bank b receives a Term Auction Facility loan
at any point within the same quarter but following the reference auction t, inclusive,
Rankb,t is the bid rank of bank b’s highest bid relative to the stop-out rate in auction t,

t

are auction fixed eﬀects, g(· ) are polynomials functions of the bid rank,
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and ✏b,t is an error term. The polynomial controls, namely g(), are fully interacted
with QT AFb,t implying that this specification allows the relationship between the
assignment variable and yb,t to vary on either side of the stop-out rate.
My outcome variable, namely yb,t , is growth in outstanding loan commitments. It
is measured at the end of the quarter during which the auction was held. The data
can therefore contain multiple observations with the same end-of-quarter outcome
value arising from two distinct sources: participation in multiple auctions within the
same quarter or a bank placing more than one bid in a particular auction. Using a
single outcome more than once in a regression discontinuity design is consistent with
other papers in the literature (e.g., see Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013)). I cluster
my standard errors at the bidder-level to account for the correlation this induces
across auctions within the same quarter for any given bidder.
My results are based on variation in Term Auction Facility borrowing induced
by banks’ highest bid being placed immediately around the stop-out rate. These
bids induce most of the variation in borrowing. In eﬀect, considering only banks’
highest bid around the stop-out rate makes the design relatively more akin to a sharp
regression discontinuity design and, therefore, facilitates a visual assessment of the
treatment eﬀect using the (unscaled) diﬀerence in means at the stop-out rate.25 It
also focuses the analysis on the most valuable liquidity for any given borrower.
I make two specific decisions due to the limited number of auctions to implement
this research design. First, the assignment variable that I use, namely Rankb,t , is a
modified version of the underlying bid rank in each auction. Specifically, in a given
auction Rankb,t = +1 (-1) when bank b’s highest bid in auction t is first among
other first bids in that auction to fall above (below) the stop-out rate. Other values
25

There is a simple explanation as to why the variation in borrowing is “more sharp” for banks’
highest bid around the stop-out rate. When a bank’s second highest bid falls immediately below the
stop-out rate, for example, it can easily obtain funding in the next auction by placing a bid that is
a linear combination of its previous two bids in the prior auction.
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of Rankb,t are defined similarly. Re-ranking bids in this manner is a choice driven
by two interconnected issues: the small sample size of oversubscribed auctions and
incomplete data for a major segment of bidders, namely foreign banks.
To illustrate the main underlying issue, Figure A.1 plots the percent of bids placed
by foreign banks by the raw bid rank within each auction. It illustrates that approximately 40 percent of bids around the stop-out rate were placed by foreign banks.
While consistent with foreign banks’ auction participation in general, the variability
will be highly influenced by the sample sizes in the two ranks immediately on either
side of the stop-out rate. As foreign banks do not report complete balance sheet
data, their inclusion in the analysis can be problematic. Excluding these banks, however, reduces the eﬀective sample size in the ranks immediately on either side of the
stop-out rate by nearly 50 percent. The re-ranking ensures that there are no “empty”
ranks owing to the necessary exclusion of foreign banks and, therefore, enhances the
precision of the average loan growth on either side of the stop-out rate.
Second, I specifically “break” apart an indicator for ever borrowing from the Term
Auction Facility during the quarter into two parts: borrowing prior to the reference
auction t and, separately, future borrowing following the reference auction t. In eﬀect,
my main endogenous variable is always “forward-looking” by only measuring borrowing in that auction and any future auction within the same quarter. This approach
acknowledges that all of the variation in quarterly borrowing induced by capacity
constraints operates through future borrowing (relative to the reference auction t)
within the same quarter. This latter point follows because at the time auction t occurs, past borrowing within the same quarter is a pre-determined variable and, hence,
is balanced at the stop-out rate. A forward-looking measure maximizes the power of
the first-stage in my empirical design.26 In eﬀect, such a measure uses the limited
26

To highlight the empirical relevance of this, the reader is referred to Figure A.2 and Table A.1.
Figure A.2 shows that discontinuous changes in total borrowing within the quarter are visually
evident. However, Table A.1 shows that, despite being economic large, under one specification the
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data more eﬃciently by acknowledging how the treatment dynamics are (and are not)
influenced by any given auction.
Overall, my primary interest is to uncover the value of

1.

This coeﬃcient an-

swers the main research question: did this auction-based liquidity matter? When
yb,t measures loan growth, a positive value of

1

indicates that this funding increased

bank lending. The main requirement to identifying

1

is that only a discrete change

in treatment arises at the stop-out rate. As banks can bid for funding in future auctions, only the probability of borrowing from the Term Auction Facility is likely to
vary discretely as one moves from one side of the stop-out rate to the other. I therefore estimate

1

by using an indicator of having a bid placed above the stop-out rate

in a given auction as an instrument for future borrowing through the Term Auction
Facility in the same quarter.
More formally, let T AFb,t be an indicator variable that equals one when bank b’s
highest bid in auction t is above the stop-out rate. Equation 1 is then estimated
using two-stage least squares (2SLS) with T AFb,t used as an instrumental variable for
QT AFb,t . The first stage of this 2SLS estimation is given by:

QT AFb,t = ↵0 +
where

0

0 T AFb,t

+ g(Rankb,t ) +

t

+

b,t ,

(2)

captures the diﬀerence in the probability of ever borrowing by the end of

the quarter at the stop-out rate. A necessary condition for a valid fuzzy regression
discontinuity design is that

0

6= 0, which indicates that the instrument is relevant

and, more specifically, that it isolates a source of exogenous variation in the otherwise
endogenous variable QT AFb,t . The inclusion of the polynomial function of bid rank,
namely g(·), and the auction fixed eﬀects ensures that the variation used to identify
1

is based solely oﬀ of banks that bid close to, but on either side of, the stop-out

first stage is not fully robust to diﬀerent bandwidth choices.
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rate in the same auction.
This empirical strategy isolates variation in access to funding for banks that,
arguably, have the smallest valuation. This is a natural consequence of bid rank
as an assignment variable, which roughly captures bidders’ valuations. The eﬀects,
therefore, likely understate the Term Auction Facility’s impact for banks whose bid
was well above the stop-out rate. This is advantageous because extrapolating to other
banks above the stop-out rate provides conservative estimates for these banks.
Table 3 provides more on this point. It correlates the characteristics associated
with being close to the stop-out rate.27 Columns 1 and 2 compare close bidders
to non-close bidders across all auctions and within the same auction, respectively.
Both columns show that being close to the stop-out rate is associated with lower
exposure to real estate. External validity, however, relates more to whether banks at
the stop-out rate are comparable to other banks that were well above the stop-out
rate. Consequently, Column 3 presents a similar result that conditions on receiving
some funding in the auction. It also shows that banks close to the stop-out rate were
larger than those above it. As size correlates with access to other funding sources,
both relationships are consistent with eﬀects at the stop-out rate underestimating
eﬀects for banks above this rate.
Second, the variation in QT AFb,t arises from the impact of having a bid marginally
fail in a given auction on the likelihood of ever being successful in obtaining Term
Auction Facility loans in future auctions. To see this, note that while a bid placed
above the stop-out in a given auction ensures that QT AFb,t equals one, not all banks
with failed bids, as noted earlier, will have QT AFb,t equal to zero. The variation in
QT AFb,t arising from the instrument is thus due to banks that are never successful in
obtaining Term Auction Facility loans because their bid in a given auction marginally
failed.
27

In this table, close is defined as being within five ranks on either side of the stop-out rate.
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It is useful to highlight why marginally failing identifies a discrete change in borrowing at a longer time horizon. Initially, note that there are two reasons why a bank
could be successful in future auctions despite having their initial bid fail. First, the
bank might have initially bid below its valuation. Such bid shading is indeed a feature of this auction setting - e.g., see Wilson (1979), Kastl (2011), and Ausubel et al.
(2014). A bank could overcome a previously unsuccessful bid by reducing the degree
to which it shades it bid. Second, a bank’s valuation for funding may be increasing
(at least relative to other bidders) over time. The bank’s bid would then eventually
exceed the stop-out rate in future auctions. These observations suggest that marginal
losers would be especially able to overcome a failed bid as they were already bidding
close to the stop-out rate.
A simple example highlights why marginally failing could nonetheless capture
a discrete change in future borrowing. For simplicity, assume that there is no bid
shading nor any growth in banks’ valuations. If the supply of short-term funds remains
constant through time, then a failed bid in a particular auction will perfectly predict
being unsuccessful in future auctions. This occurs because a bank with a valuation
marginally below the market clearing rate has no room to adjust its bid since it
already equals its valuation. The amount of variation in borrowing that is identified
from this empirical design is, thus, an empirical matter. The next section highlights
the variation in treatment at the stop-out rate.
1.3.1.1. Term Auction Facility Borrowing at the Stop-Out Rate
I begin by highlighting marginal losers’ propensity to pursue funding in future auctions. Table 4 presents the bidding data across U.S. banks. It indicates that 85
percent of banks that fell one below the stop-out rate bid in the next auction. Approximately 90.5, 57.1 and 70 percent of banks that fell two, three, and four below the
stop-out rate also bid in the next auction. Repeated bidding is clearly important in
23

this environment. Nonetheless, it does not immediately follow that banks whose bid
failed in a given auction are ultimately successful at actually obtaining Term Auction
Facility loans in future auctions.
Figure 3 evaluates this possibility. It plots the relationship between the probability of receiving a loan request in a given auction and banks’ bid rank. Given the
institutional setting, banks with bids above the stop-out rate receive their loan request, which is indicated with a positive bid rank, whereas those below the stop-out
rate do not. This is visually represented as a jump in the probability of receiving
a loan in the auction moving from zero on the left of the stop-out rate to one on
the other side. This panel plots the instrument, namely T AFb,t , underlying my fuzzy
regression discontinuity design.
Figure 4 plots the relationship between the probability of receiving a Term Auction
Facility loan by the end of the quarter and a banks’ bid rank. This chart expands
on Figure 3 by incorporating a broader time horizon. The dependent variable in
this chart is the main endogenous treatment variable, namely QT AFb,t from Section
1.3.1. It is measured relative to a reference auction. Bid rank is thus the rank within
the reference auction and the dependent variable accounts for access to funding in
the reference auction or through any subsequent auction within the same quarter.
As noted earlier, all banks that receive a loan in a given auction, by definition, also
receive a loan within the same quarter as that auction, which is why the charts in
Figures 3 and 4 are identical above the stop-out rate. The relevant issue is whether
banks below the stop-out rate ultimately obtain Term Auction Facility loans in future
auctions.
Figure 4 illustrates that banks are partially successful in this regard. It is apparent
that a considerable percent of banks with failed bids obtain funding in future auctions
as shown on the left side of the stop-out rate. The chart illustrates that, conditional
on being below the stop-out rate, there is a positive relationship between interest
24

rate bid and the probability of borrowing by the end of the quarter. About 15
percent of banks, for example, with a bid that fell 20 ranks below the stop-out rate
obtain funding at some point within the quarter. This figure increases to around 50
percent for banks whose bid was immediately below the stop-out rate. This jump
in the probability of borrowing is the exogenous variation in access to Term Auction
Facility loans that underlies my main empirical results.28
Table 5 provides the empirical results that correspond to this visual evidence. It
presents the results using the optimal bandwidth of +/- 7 bids around the stop-out
rate and, additionally, using all of the data, but more flexible controls for bid rank.29
Panel A of Table 5 indicates that approximately 50 percent of marginal losers obtain
Term Auction Facility loans within the quarter. This is indicated by a discontinuity
of approximately 50 percentage points at the stop-out rate, which is economically
large and statistically significant. The magnitude of the discontinuity decreases only
slightly when I do not restrict to +/- 7 bids, but it is still large at around 47 percentage
points and statistically significant. Banks are clearly able to partially overcome failing
by pursuing funding in future auctions.
1.3.1.2. Balance of Baseline Covariates at the Stop-Out Rate
A valid regression discontinuity design hinges on the continuity of baseline covariates
at the stop-out rate. Table 6 provides estimates of the average pre-existing diﬀerences
at the stop-out rate. It examines six characteristics measured as of 2007Q3: the
natural log of bank size, total loans (relative to assets), loans secured by real estate
(relative to assets), mortgage-backed securities holdings (relative to assets), deposits
28

While Figure 3 suggests that the variation in treatment is along the extensive margin, my
results are actually capturing intensive margin changes. Many of these banks had borrowed in
previous auctions within the quarter. Although the extent to which they have done so is balanced
at the stop-out rate. This balance is due to outcomes in past auction auctions, even those within
the same quarter, in eﬀect being pre-determined variables.
29
The optimal bandwidth is based on Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014).
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(relative to liabilities), and wholesale funding (relative to assets). The results indicate
that there are no significant discontinuities in any of these variables. Figure 5 plots
these characteristics against the banks’ bid rank. The x-axis measures the distance of
each bid from the stop-out rate, with a positive value indicating the bid was accepted
and a negative value indicating the bid failed, i.e. the borrower was not granted a
loan. A circle indicates the average value within that bid rank and vertical bars plot
95-percent confidence intervals. Visually, there are no significant discontinuities at
the stop-out rate.
Banks may nonetheless diﬀer along unobservable dimensions at the stop-out rate.
Marginal winners did, for example, place a higher bid than marginal losers. This
might suggest one unobserved diﬀerence: a higher valuation for emergency funding.
Nonetheless, there is unlikely to even be a one-to-one relationship between banks’
valuations and their bids near the market-clearing rate. When banks are restricted
from submitting continuous bid functions, as they are in this context, bids may be
placed above marginal values when there is a positive probability of the bid falling
below the market-clearing interest rate (Kastl (2011)). This indicates that one cannot
infer from marginally winning that a bank must have a valuation that is weakly larger
than the marginal losers. Even small diﬀerences in marginal valuations is tolerable
within a regression discontinuity design, provided there is not a discrete change at
the stop-out rate.30
Banks could also strategically sort in a way that generates diﬀerences in other
un-observables at the stop-out rate. While one cannot test for such discontinuities,
there are two reasons to doubt they are present. First, the stop-out rate is unknown
at the time of the auction. Uncertainty in the level of demand for Term Auction Facility loans alone implies that only the distribution of the stop-out rate is (potentially)
30

I did place a separate FOIA request to obtain information on diﬀerences in the interest rate bid
between marginal winners and losers. This request was denied by the Federal Reserve.
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known ex ante. Second, even with limited uncertainty, extremely small diﬀerences
in bids can determine when the auction’s capacity is exhausted. Bids can be submitted with interest rates specified up to three decimal places, implying that the
diﬀerence between marginally winning and losing can be determined by arbitrarily
small diﬀerences in bids.

1.4 Results
I evaluate the impact of the Term Auction Facility. I focus on banks’ growth in
outstanding loan commitments. In the seminal model of Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein
(2002), banks provide liquidity to borrowers via loan commitments, which are contractual agreements to provide funding. To eﬀectively do this, banks must hold liquid
assets to help fund unpredictable drawdowns. Liquidity pressures can therefore damage banks’ ability to commit new funding to borrowers.
Loan commitments are an important component of financial intermediation. The
Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending indicates, for example, that
approximately 80 percent of commercial loans in general, 85 percent of those granted
by U.S. banks, and 87 percent granted by large U.S. banks are made under commitment as of 2007Q3.31
I specifically focus on outstanding loan commitment growth. This outcome variable thus measures the “unused” component of the commitment. Captured in this
manner, outstanding commitments increase either when banks grant more loans or
because borrowers reduce drawdowns on pre-existing credit lines. Both outcomes are
possible responses to Term Auction Facility funding. The former possibility is simple:
banks may intermediate more if they borrower more. The latter could arise if banks
sought Term Auction Facility funding to compensate for a borrower-based run on
31

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/200712/e2.pdf.
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pre-existing credit lines. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that borrowers ran on
lines of credit during the crisis.
Focusing on this variable is valuable from two perspectives. First, outstanding
commitments were quickly declining in the early stages of the crisis. Figure 6 highlights this decline. It plots the evolution of aggregate outstanding commitments and
on balance sheet loans. Each line is the natural log of the level, with values normalized as of 2007Q3. As a result, the value at each point in time captures the percent
diﬀerence between the level at that point in time relative to 2007Q3. The dashed line
is for outstanding commitments, whereas the solid line is for on-balance sheet loans.
While both variables were increasing leading up to the crisis, it shows that by 2008Q4
outstanding commitments declined by over 10 percent below its 2007Q3.
Second, this variable yields more statistical power. There is more power as the
outcome responds in the same way to the lending and credit line run-based channels. Even if one did not know which channel was at work, an impact on outstanding
commitment growth is nonetheless economically interesting. Consider my null hypothesis: auction-based liquidity via the Term Auction Facility did not matter. Also
note that my empirical design compares marginal winners relative to banks that can
replicate the same funding through the discount window. The results should then
capture banks’ outstanding commitment growth relative to that growth had only discount window funding been in place. Nonetheless, I distinguish between these two
alternative explanations through additional results.
I initially highlight the Term Auction Facility’s impact in several ways. I first confirm the absence of pre-existing diﬀerences in outstanding loan commitment growth at
the stop-out rate. A discontinuous change, if it were to exist, would cast doubt on my
empirical design by suggesting that within-sample diﬀerences in my outcome variable
arise for reasons other than the Term Auction Facility. Figure 7 plots outstanding
commitment growth in 2007Q3, which is the quarter before the establishment of the
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Term Auction Facility. The x-axis measures banks’ bid rank relative to the stop-out
rate. Positive and negative values indicate that a bid fell above and below the stop-out
rate, respectively. Each blue dot displays the average outstanding loan commitment
growth within each rank. The vertical lines denote 95-percent confidence intervals.
The grey lines are third-order polynomials on either side of the stop-out rate. This
chart illustrates the absence of any pre-existing discontinuity.
Panel A of Table 7 provides the statistical evidence corresponding to Figure 7.
It presents the evidence in two main ways. Columns 1 and 2 provide the results
using only data within the optimal bandwidth, i.e. +/- 7 bid ranks around the stopout rate, and control for banks’ bid rank using linear and quadratic polynomials.
Columns 3 and 4 provide the results when I do not restrict the sample to the optimal
bandwidth, henceforth “using all of the data”, but include more flexible controls for bid
rank. Overall, these results confirm the qualitative evidence in Figure 7. The point
estimates are all close to zero and insignificant. The absence of any discontinuity as
of 2007Q3 contrasts with after the Term Auction Facility was established.
Figure 8 plots outstanding commitment growth against banks’ bid rank within
the sample following the establisment of the Term Auction Facility. A discontinuity
at the stop-out rate is evident. Panel B of Table 7 provides estimates the magnitude.
It also presents the results using the optimal bandwidth and, separately, using all the
data. The point estimates are very similar, ranging from 0.06 to 0.13, indicating that
the outstanding loan commitment growth of marginal winners is at least 6% more
than marginal losers. Nonetheless, the diﬀerence in average outcomes must be scaled
by the change in the probability of treatment at the stop-out rate to reflect the Term
Auction Facility’s full impact (Lee and Lemieux (2010); Imbens and Lemieux (2008)).
Table 8 provides the fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates of the average
treatment eﬀect of the Term Auction Facility. It uses an indicator for receiving a
loan in a given auction as an instrument for ever borrowing by the end of the quarter.
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Section 1.3.1 highlighted that this empirical strategy leverages marginally losing to
isolate exogenous variation in Term Auction Facility borrowing at the quarterly-level.
Panel A presents the 2SLS first stage, which illustrates the relationship between the
endogenous treatment variable and the underlying instrument. Columns 1 and 2,
which use the optimal bandwidth, and Columns 3 and 4, which use all the data,
indicate a strong first stage relationship. The point estimates are statistically significant and range from 0.49 to 0.57 across specifications. They indicate that marginally
losing isolates an economically relevant jump in the probability of borrowing by the
end of the quarter of about 50 percentage points.
Panel B of Table 8 highlights the Term Auction Facility’s impact. It provides
the estimates of

1

in Equation 1. The point estimates can be derived as the raw

diﬀerence in average loan commitment growth, e.g. in Panel B of Table 8, divided by
the diﬀerence in the probability of ever borrowing from the Term Auction Facility on
either side of the stop-out rate. The results are significant and economically large.
They indicate that the Term Auction Facility increased outstanding loan commitment
growth by over 15 percentage points. The eﬀect is consistent with a large aggregate
decline in outstanding loan commitments at this time.
With outstanding commitments measuring the “unused” component of commitments, an increase can arise either when banks grant more loans or because borrowers stop drawing down on their pre-existing lines of credit. An increase in loan
commitments due to Term Auction Facility funding, therefore, could merit a diﬀerent
interpretation: borrowers were concerned about their lender’s health and they were,
consequently, drawing down on pre-existing lines of credit to ensure their access to
credit, and access to Term Auction Facility funding ultimately arrested this bank run.
While such precautionary draw-downs have been documented in the literature,
Term Auction Facility borrowing was confidential and so banks might have to reveal
this information to their borrowers under this alternative interpretation. As bor30

rowing from a central bank is thought to convey negative information about banks’
health, it would be surprising that i) banks would elect to provide such information
to their borrowers and ii) if so, that this information revelation would be eﬀective in
calming concerns about its underlying financial condition. To this point, Bernanke
(2015) notes that “no borrower would allow itself to be so identified, for fear of the
inferences that might be drawn about its financial health.”
Table 9 nonetheless explores these two explanations. Panel A presents fuzzy regression discontinuity results using on-balance sheet loan growth as the outcome variable. Under the borrower-based run story, if the Term Auction Facility is arresting
precautionary drawdowns, then there should be a negative eﬀect on the growth in onbalance sheet loans. Panel A highlights that the results are positive, but statistically
insignificant. By contrast, Panel B examines overall credit growth, defined as the
sum of on-balance sheet loans and oﬀ-balance sheet loan commitments. By summing
these two components, a positive treatment eﬀect would only arise from an increase
in credit supply. Consistent with this possibility, Panel B indicates that the results
are positive and statistically significant. The results indicate that the overall loan
growth of marginal winners was around 6-8% higher due to access to Term Auction
Facility liquidity.
I also explore why this lending eﬀect exists. The lending eﬀect might arise in
part because banks whose loan request failed subsequently reduce lending instead of
borrowing at the discount window. While the existence of discount window stigma is
well-established, e.g. see Armantier et al. (2015), the broader consequences of stigma
on lending are largely unknown. In principle, stigma could explain the lending eﬀect
as all Term Auction Facility bidders were eligible to borrow at the Federal Reserve’s
discount window, where similar loans are granted on a no questions asked basis. Banks
that failed to receive Term Auction Facility loans could, as a result, have replicated
the same funding structure at the discount window. Alternatively, it might arise as
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Term Auction Facility loans were at times less expensive than the discount window.
To test the stigma-based explanation, I examine the lending eﬀect in the subsample where the auctions where more expensive than the discount window. During
these auctions, a bank whose bid was marginally below the market-clearing rate in
the auctions could have immediately borrowed at the discount window at a relatively
lower interest rate. Table 10 shows that the lending eﬀect is similar in magnitude in
this sub-sample relative to the full sample result. This suggests that some banks may
have placed a bid above the discount window rate that fell below the auction market
clearing rate ex post, but were not willing to subsequently replicate the loan request
at the discount window. In eﬀect, it suggests that banks were willing to take loans
through the auctions that they were not willing to take through the discount window
simply because of stigma.
I assess the robustness of this result in several ways. First, I examine the robustness to controlling for past Term Auction Facility borrowing within the quarter. As
the auctions occurred more frequently than my outcome variables, my data is stacked
at the auction-level and outcomes are measured in a “forward-looking” manner at the
quarterly-level. My main endogenous variable, namely QT AFb,t , includes borrowing
in a given reference auction and all subsequent auctions within the same quarter. This
choice adds power to the first stage, but leaves open the possibility that a positive correlation between past-borrowing and QT AFb,t could bias the result upwards.32 Table
A.2 provides the fuzzy regression discontinuity results that control for past borrowing
within the same quarter. The results are virtually identical to those in Table 8.
Second, I evaluate its robustness to changes in the bandwidth. The results in
Table 8 highlight this robustness at a broad-level by presenting the results for two
diﬀerent approaches: using the optimal bandwidth and also all the data. Figures A.3
provide a more detailed assessment. Figure A.3 plots the fuzzy regression disconti32

See Section 1.3.1 for a discussion of this approach.
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nuity estimates for various bandwidths when a linear specification is used to control
for the assignment variable. The solid line provides the point estimates, which are
comparable to Panel B of Table 8, for bandwidths that cover +/- 3 observations to
+/- 25 observations around the stop-out rate. While the magnitude of the coeﬃcient
declines slightly over larger bandwidths, the loan commitment eﬀect is significant in
virtually all of these specifications. Figure A.4 provides a similar chart when using a quadratic polynomial to control for the assignment variable. In this case, the
point estimates are more stable across bandwidths, relative to Figure A.3, but also
significantly diﬀerent from zero in virtually all cases.
Third, I examine the robustness to inclusion of the two oversubscribed auctions
for 84-day maturity loans. I specifically focused my main results on the auctions for
28- or 35-day maturity loans (which account for 21 of the 23 oversubscribed auctions).
This decision ensures similarity between these two funding sources as discount window
loans had a maturity up to 30 days. For the 84-day auctions, a marginal loser cannot
replicate a similar loan at the discount window. The results are unchanged by adding
these two additional auctions, as highlighted in Table A.3.
Finally, I examine the robustness to the process of re-ranking bids in defining
Rankb,t . More specifically, I re-estimate the main result using the raw bid rank,
which includes many empty ranks owing to the exclusion of foreign banks. Table A.4
provides the results for the impact using only highest bids placed around the stop-out
rate. It illustrates that the result is still present even in the absence of this re-ranking
process.

1.5 Discussion
This paper studies the impact of emergency liquidity provision at the onset of the
2007-09 financial crisis. It specifically focuses on whether the nature of how short-
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term funding is provided is ultimately important for bank credit supply. It does so in
the context of a novel emergency lending program that played a key role in the Federal
Reserve’s policymaking as illiquidity in financial markets became more important in
mid-2007. I propose an identification strategy based on auction capacity constraints
that isolates a source of exogenous variation auction-based, short-term loans from the
Federal Reserve. I find a sizable impact on banks’ outstanding loan commitments,
which appears to arise from an eﬀect on bank loan supply.
A unique feature of this setting is that all banks that were eligible to bid for Term
Auction Facility funding could borrow at the discount window on a no questions asked
basis. This suggests discount window stigma as a possible mechanism connecting
short-term liquidity and bank lending in my setting. This follows as my empirical
design compares banks that received access to Term Auction Facility funding relative
to those banks that did not but were free to borrow the same amount, over the same
maturity, with the same collateral through the discount window. I provide some
evidence consistent with stigma, which is consistent with a concern that banks may
resort to costly alternatives, e.g. sell assets or reduce lending, as they delay going to
the discount window (e.g., see Armantier et al. (2015)).
My results relate to the theoretical literature on illiquidity. While I do not find an
eﬀect of Term Auction Facility funding on U.S. bank assets, this is interesting as much
of the theoretical literature emphasizes the relationship between illiquidity and bank
asset sales (Shleifer and Vishny (2011)). Indeed, such a relationship is important as
fire sales create the non-pecuniary externalities that reinforce deteriorating financial
conditions (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). Of course, the impact on asset sales may
have occurred following my sample. Liquidity provision in my setting could also
reduce asset sales indirectly through its eﬀect on the banks’ borrowers. We know
that illiquidity can have real eﬀects during a crisis, e.g. Benmelech, Meisenzahl, and
Ramcharan (2016), so the liquidity provision through the Term Auction Facility likely
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had important eﬀects on real outcomes as well.
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1.6 Tables and Figures

36

37

Mean
(2)
52.86
27.16
95.5
73.7
45.7
1,157.5
2.89

St. Dev.
(3)
21.25
13.40
16.9
11.1
13.5
1,619.4
0.74

Min
(4)
20.00
7.45
58.0
52.0
24.0
1.4
2.10

5th
(5)
20.00
9.17
63.0
53.0
29.0
10.0
2.22

50th
(6)
50.00
25.46
96.0
74.0
43.0
500.0
2.62

95th
(7)
75.00
42.60
116.0
88.0
65.0
5,000.0
4.65

Max
(8)
75.00
58.56
132.0
94.0
72.0
7,500.0
4.67

Note: This table summarizes the characteristics of the oversubscribed auctions in my sample. Auctioncapacity
is the total amount (in billions) of funding granted through the auction. U nmet requests is the total quantity
(in billions) of loans demanded in excess of the auction capacity. N o. of bids is the total number of bids that
were placed in the auction. N o. of bidders is the total number of bidders that participated in the auction.
N o.of borrowers is the number of borrowers. Loansize is the total size of the loan (in millions). Stop-outrate
is the auction’s market-clearing interest rate.

Auction capacity
Unmet requests
No. of bids
No. of bidders
No. of borrowers
Loan size ($ million)
Stop-out rate

Obs.
(1)
21
21
21
21
21
959
21

Table 1: Auction Characteristics
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Mean
(2)
66.49
0.31
0.06
0.55
0.04
0.39

St. dev.
(3)
245.56
0.27
0.08
0.28
0.05
0.49

Min
(4)
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

5th
(5)
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00

50th
(6)
9.40
0.33
0.03
0.67
0.02
0.00

95th
(7)
169.78
0.70
0.24
0.89
0.13
1.00

Max
(8)
1,818.17
0.88
0.45
0.99
0.45
1.00

Note: This table summarizes the characteristics of the commercial banks in my sample. T otal assets is total
assets in $ billion. Real estate, M BS, T otal lending, Cash holdings are total loans secured by real estate,
mortgage-backed securities, total loans, and cash holdings as a % of total assets. F oreign is an indicator equal
to one if the bidder is a foreign bank. Bank characteristics are measured as of Q32007.

Total assets (in $ billion)
Real estate (% of assets)
MBS (% of assets)
Total lending (% of assets)
Cash holdings (% of assets)
Foreign

Obs.
(1)
153
153
153
153
153
153

Table 2: Bidder Characteristics

Table 3: Bank Characteristics and Proximity to the Stop-Out Rate

(1)
Log assets
Liquid assets
Real estate loans
MBS securities
Wholesale funding
Loan commitments
Bidder sample
Auction f.e.
R2
Obs.

I{Close to stop-out rate}
(2)
(3)

0.014*
(0.008)
-0.319*
(0.172)
-0.270**
(0.111)
-0.203
(0.265)
0.011*
(0.006)
-0.138
(0.143)

0.013*
(0.008)
-0.318*
(0.173)
-0.271**
(0.112)
-0.146
(0.268)
0.011*
(0.006)
-0.130
(0.144)

0.031**
(0.012)
-0.192
(0.240)
-0.362**
(0.170)
-0.530
(0.418)
0.007
(0.008)
0.080
(0.213)

All
No

All
Yes

Successful
Yes

0.03
798

0.03
798

0.06
434

Note: This table summarizes the relationship between bank characteristics
and proximity to the stop-out rate. Assets is measured in natural log and
loan commitments measures unused loan commitments relative to the sum
of on-balance sheet loans and unused commitments. All other variables
are measured relative to assets. All variables are measured as of Q32007.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table 4: Marginal Losers’ Probability of Bidding in the Next Auction
% of banks that bid in next auction
(1)

Rank
Rank
Rank
Rank

=
=
=
=

1
2
3
4

85.00

(2)

90.48

(3)

57.14

(4)

70.00

Note: This table summarizes the probability of bidding in the next auction
for banks whose bid fell marginally below the stop-out rate. Rank is the bid
rank relative to the stop-out rate.
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Table 5: Term Auction Facility Borrowing at the Stop-Out Rate

Variable
1{Bid Stop
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
R2
Obs.

out}

P rob{Receive TAF loan before end of quarter}
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.504***
0.591***
0.489***
0.462***
(0.106)
(0.183)
(0.090)
(0.134)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
0.47
272

0.47
272

0.60
706

0.60
706

Note: This table summarizes the variation in Term Auction Facility borrowing
around the stop-out rate. The results are presented in two ways: using the
optimal bandwidth and, separately, using all of the data. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable that equals one if a bank receives a Term
Auction Facility by the end of the quarter relative to a reference auction (see
Section 1.3.1). I{Bid > Stop out} is an indicator variable that equals one
for bids above the stop-out rate. P olynomial refers to the order of polynomial
used to control for bid rank. The optimal bandwidth includes bids within
+/- 7 of the stop-out rate. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table 6: Balance of Pre-Determined Characteristics
Polynomial
(1)
First
Second

Coeﬀ.
(2)

Loans (as % of assets)

(3)

Obs.
(4)

R2
(5)

1.073*
-0.641

0.604
1.633

272
272

0.03
0.04

First
Second

-0.029
0.013

0.034
0.098

272
272

0.002
0.01

Real estate (% of assets)

First
Second

-0.054
0.039

0.042
0.113

272
272

0.01
0.02

MBS (% of assets)

First
Second

0.017
0.004

0.013
0.026

272
272

0.01
0.01

Deposits (% of liab.)

First
Second

-0.002
-0.086

0.034
0.063

272
272

0.003
0.02

Wholesale funding

First
Second

-0.011
0.037

0.033
0.068

272
272

0.005
0.01

Ln(Total assets)

Note: This table summarizes the variation in pre-determined characteristics around
the stop-out rate. Ln(Assets) is the natural log of total assets. Loans, Real estate,
and M BS are total loans, loans secured by real estate, and mortgage-backed securities
holdings, respectively, measured as a % of total assets. Deposits measures deposits
as a % of liabilities. W holesale f unding is a measure of banks’ reliance on wholesale
funding. P olynomial refers to the order of polynomial used to control for bid rank. These
variables are measured as of Q32007. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table 7: Outstanding Loan Commitment Growth at the Stop-Out Rate

Variable
1{Bid Stop

out}

Polynomial
Auction f.e.
R2
Obs.

Variable
1{Bid Stop
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
R2
Obs.

Panel A: Prior
Optimal BW
(1)
(2)
0.006
0.035
(0.015)
(0.031)
First
Second
p
p
0.05
272

out}

0.06
272

to sample
Full sample
(3)
(4)
0.012
0.025
(0.014)
(0.025)
Third
Fourth
p
p
0.09
704

0.09
704

Panel B: Discontinuity in sample
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.060**
0.130**
0.064***
0.095***
(0.026)
(0.050)
(0.021)
(0.028)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
0.09
272

0.11
272

0.10
704

0.10
704

Note: This table highlights the variation in outstanding loan commitment
growth around the stop-out rate. The results are presented in two ways: using the optimal bandwidth and, separately, using all of the data. The dependent variable is the quaterly change in natural log of outstanding loan
commitments. I{Bid > Stop out} is an indicator variable that equals
one for bids above the stop-out rate. P olynomial refers to the order of
polynomial used to control for bid rank. The optimal bandwidth includes
bids within +/- 7 of the stop-out rate. Panel A provides the variation
in loan commitment growth at the stop-out rate in Q32007, which shows
that there was no pre-existing discontinuity prior to the Term Auction Facility. Panel B provides the reduced-form estimates of being granted a
loan in a given auction. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table 8: Fuzzy RDD Estimates of the Term Auction Facility’s Impact

Variable
1{Bid Stop

out}

F-test statistic

Variable
1{T AF by qtr. end}
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.

Panel A: First stage
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.497***
0.572***
0.511***
0.489***
(0.094)
(0.161)
(0.081)
(0.122)
51.72

48.34

391.60

579.56

Panel B: IV estimates
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.121***
0.227***
0.126***
0.195***
(0.045)
(0.084)
(0.035)
(0.059)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
272

272

704

704

Note: This table presents fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates of the
impact of the Term Auction Facility on outstanding loan commitment growth.
The results are presented in two ways: using the optimal bandwidth and,
separately, using all of the data. The main outcome variable is the quaterly
change in natural log of outstanding loan commitments. 1{T AF by qtr. end}
is an indicator variable that equals one for banks that borrow through the
Term Auction Facility before the end of the quarter relative to the reference auction (see Section 1.3.1). This quarterly borrowing variable is instrumented for using I{Bid > Stop out}, which is an indicator variable
that equals one for banks whose bid was above the stop-out rate in the reference auction. P olynomial refers to the order of polynomial used to control
for bid rank. Panel A provides the first stage results and Panel B provides
the main 2SLS estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table 9: Fuzzy RDD Estimates by Loan Type

Variable
1{T AF by qtr. end}
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.

Variable
1{T AF by qtr. end}
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.

Panel A: On balance sheet loan growth
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.059*
0.084
0.057*
0.084
(0.035)
(0.063)
(0.030)
(0.057)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
272

272

704

704

Panel B: Overall credit growth
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.057**
0.086**
0.058***
0.080**
(0.025)
(0.037)
(0.018)
(0.037)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
272

272

704

704

Note: This table presents fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates by
loan type. The results are presented in two ways: using the optimal bandwidth
and, separately, using all of the data. 1{T AF by qtr. end} is an indicator variable that equals one for banks that borrow through the Term Auction Facility
before the end of the quarter relative to the reference auction (see Section
1.3.1). This quarterly borrowing variable is instrumented for using I{Bid >
Stop out}, which is an indicator variable that equals one for banks whose bid
was above the stop-out rate in the reference auction. P olynomial refers to the
order of polynomial used to control for bid rank. Panel A provides the results
for on-balance sheet loans. Panel B provides the results when using a measure
of credit growth that includes both on balance sheet loans and oﬀ-balance
sheet loan commitments. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table 10: Results when the Stop-Out Exceeds the Discount Rate

Variable
1{T AF by qtr. end}
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.
First stage p < 0.05
F-test statistic

Dependent variable: Outstanding commitments
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.119**
0.227**
0.176***
0.207**
(0.053)
(0.092)
(0.048)
(0.084)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
147
Yes
65.13

147
Yes
56.49

386
Yes
473.93

386
Yes
401.44

Note: This table presents fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates in the
sub-sample where loans through the auctions were more expensive than those
at the discount window. The results are presented in two ways: using the
optimal bandwidth and, separately, using all of the data. 1{T AF by qtr. end}
is an indicator variable that equals one for banks that borrow through the
Term Auction Facility before the end of the quarter relative to the reference auction (see Section 1.3.1). This quarterly borrowing variable is instrumented for using I{Bid > Stop
out}, which is an indicator variable that equals one for banks whose bid was above the stop-out rate in
the reference auction. P olynomial refers to the order of polynomial used
to control for bid rank. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Figure 1: TED Spread During the Early Stages of the Crisis

Note: This figure plots the TED spread from 01/2007 until 09/2008. The
vertical red line denotes August 9th, 2007.
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Figure 2: Summary of Auction Capacity Constraints
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Note: This figure plots the evolution of the total value of Term Auction
Facility loans requested in excess of the auction capacity constraint.
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Figure 3: Probability that Loan Request is Accepted in an Auction
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Note: This figure plots the probability of receiving a loan within a given
auction as a function of the bid rank in that auction. By the institutional
design, bids placed above the stop-out rate receive the requested loan and
those bids placed below do not. This is captured by the sharp jump from
zero to one at the stop-out rate.
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Figure 4: Probability of TAF Loan by the Quarter End
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Note: This figure plots the relationship between treatment status, i.e.
receiving a Term Auction Facility loan, and banks’ bid rank relative to
the stop-out rate using banks’ first bid in each auction. The dependent
variable is the probability of receiving a Term Auction Facility loan before
the end of the quarter during which the auction was held (including the
reference auction).

50

Figure 5: Balance of Pre-Determined Bank Characteristics
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Panel E: Deposits
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Note: This figure plots six pre-determined characteristics against the stopout rate. All variables are measured as of Q32007. Panel A plots the natural
log of total assets. Panel B, C, and D plot total loans, loans secured by real
estate and mortgage-backed securities holdings as a % of total assets. Panel E
plots deposits (as a % of liabilities) by bid rank. Panel F plots the wholesale
funding ratio by bid rank.
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Figure 6: Aggregate Lending Around Sample Period
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Note: This figure plots the time series of total loans of commercial banks
operating in the U.S. The solid line plots the total loans value of on-balance
sheet loans and the dashed line plots the total for oﬀ-balance sheet loans,
i.e. outstanding loan commitments. Each line is plotted in natural logs
and is normalized to zero in Q32007, which is the last quarter prior to the
establishment of the Term Auction Facility. The value of each chart can then
be interpreted as the approximate percentage change relative to Q32007. The
first and last quarter in the plot is Q32006 and Q42008, respectively.
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Figure 7: Outstanding Commitment Growth Prior to Sample
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Note: This figure plots the relationship between loan commitment growth
and banks’ bid rank relative to the stop-out rate as of Q32007. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the natural log of outstanding
loan commitments. Each dot is the average outstanding commitment growth
within the corresponding bid rank. Vertical lines indicate 95-percent confidence intervals. The grey lines are third-order polynomials on either side of
the stop-out rate. The lack of any discontinuity at the stop-out rate illustrates that in-sample diﬀerences in loan commitment growth at the stop-out
rate were not present prior to the Term Auction Facility.
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Figure 8: Commitment Growth Around the Stop-Out Rate

-20 -18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Rank Relative to the Stop-Out Rate

Note: This figure plots the relationship between loan commitment growth
and banks’ bid rank relative to the stop-out rate. The dependent variable
is the quarterly change in the natural log of outstanding loan commitments.
Each dot is the average outstanding commitment growth within the corresponding bid rank. Vertical lines indicate 95-percent confidence intervals.
The grey lines are third-order polynomials on either side of the stop-out
rate. The discontinuity at the stop-out rate illustrates the impact of the
Term Auction Facility.
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Figure 9: Comparison of Stop-Out and Discount Window Rates
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Chapter 2:
Stakeholder Governance and the Threat of Disclosure
Eric Moore
Abstract
I study the relationship between confidentiality and contract enforcement. I specifically examine whether publicly exposing past-due borrowers increases their lenders’
propensity to seek loan recovery through the legal system. I explore this question in
the context of a large rise in past-due loans within India’s government-owned banks,
which led a bank employees’ association to disclose the largest defaulters’ identities
and loan amounts. Overall, this group increased the probability of legal enforcement
by about 10%, with most of this eﬀect arising from their initial threat to expose
these defaulters. Lenders targeted past-due borrowers that could likely have avoided
default, which is consistent with a desire to reduce the perception of corruption that
might follow from disclosure.
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2.1 Overview
“Part of the problem has been that the shadow of political masters always
looms large over state-owned banks. Receiving intimidating phone calls
from well-connected borrowers is a routine hazard for every chief executive
in a government bank.”
Economic Times, April 17th, 2013
Banks help foster long-term growth, yet their eﬀective governance is challenging. Difficulties arise as governments often impose restrictions on the natural mechanisms of
corporate governance - e.g., concentrated ownership, activist investors, among others.33 Extensive government ownership of banks in many countries also enables public
oﬃcials to serve their private interests at the expense of an eﬃcient capital allocation.
How then can banks operate prudently while under government influence? I study
this question by assessing whether publicly exposing defaulters increases their banks’
willingness to seek legal recovery of past-due loans.
This question is important for several reasons. First, banks’ recovery rates influence financial development.34 If exposing defaulters increases legal enforcement, then
it is likely to indirectly promote access to capital. Second, should political corruption
deter legal enforcement, then public disclosure could counteract this influence. Third,
the magnitude of the benefits from exposing defaulters is unclear. Quantifying these
benefits is important as the practice is becoming more common in India despite being
controversial due to the potential negative eﬀects on borrowers.35 Lastly, leaks of confidential information are, arguably, growing in importance. This question illustrates
33

Rajan and Zingales (1998) highlights the eﬀect of financial development on growth. Laeven
(2013) provides a good overview of the governance challenges facing banks.
34
Higher recovery rates stem from better legal protections for secured creditors. A large literature
studies the connections between a country’s legal system and financial outcomes. Bae and Goyal
(2009), for example, show that better enforceability leads to more lending.
35
India Today (2013), Moneylife (2013), Times of India (2011, 2013a), discuss banks’ use of
disclosure to recover loans, its potential costs, and the corresponding controversy over its use.
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some issues that arise in the context of such disclosures. Answering this question is
nonetheless challenging as disclosure is typically not random.
I study this question in the context of India’s public-sector banks. Between 2010
and 2013, these banks’ non-performing loans nearly tripled. This rapid increase led a
bank employee association in India to publicly expose the identities and past-due loan
amounts for largest defaulters within the country’s public-sector banks. Claiming that
a “nexus” between government oﬃcials and India’s public-sector banks was responsible
for many of these defaults, they sought to combat non-performing loan growth by
expanding the public’s knowledge about potential corruption.36 They first exposed
the largest 50 defaulters overall and simultaneously threatened to disclose the largest
30 defaults within each bank. They subsequently revealed the full list six months
later.
I study these disclosures’ impact on India’s public-sector banks. I examine whether
they led these banks to seek legal recovery from their past-due borrowers.37 Banks
might increase legal enforcement to reduce the appearance of corruption resulting
from the disclosures. When only bank-level defaults are known publicly, exposing
defaulters increases awareness of firms’ repayment capacity. A borrower’s ability to
have avoided its default could suggest corruption if its lenders also avoid seeking loan
recovery.
A variety of evidence highlights the relevance of this point. The group that exposed
the defaulters noted that banks “played foul” by hiding defaults under the guise of
performing loans to avoid the costs of high non-performing loans (FirstPost (2014)).
Lenders also come under pressure often from India’s finance ministry to restructure
36

This is consistent with the perception that India’s public-sector banks exclusively soft on large
borrowers and other evidence of direct government influence to essentially hide defaults (Times of
India (2014b)).
37
Public-sector bank, which is the term used in India, is synonymous with government-owned
bank.
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loans before they turn non-performing (Times of India (2014b)).38 Furthermore, large
defaulters’ assets were discussed by the media in the context of their default: Reuters
(2013) highlighted that one firm “owns a golf course near its plant in western India
and its chairman ... talks of the high salaries he pays his employees” despite being
in default on $250 million in debt.39 FirstPost (2014) also noted that while Vijay
Mallya’s company Kingfisher Airlines topped the defaulter list, he was “busy cheering”
on his cricket team. Times of India (2014a) further highlighted that Vijay Mallya’s
“lavish lifestyle, despite his company’s financial woes, has raised many eyebrows.”
Legal enforcement removes one of these two components, thus reducing potential
negative publicity that could follow from the disclosures. Beyond the potential of
disclosure to increase enforcement, the threat to expose defaulters alone could exert
an independent influence on legal enforcement. This stems from the group’s silence
regarding when the defaulter list would be constructed. Disclosure based on a contemporaneous list of defaulters would allow banks to remove firms from the list, thus
altering the composition of borrowers included in any subsequent disclosure. The
focus on government corruption at the time suggests that reducing the prevalence
of strategic defaults would be especially valuable. This strategic ambiguity meant
that banks might respond as if they could remove firms, even though the eventual
disclosure had been constructed prior to the threat.
Isolating the disclosures’ impact is challenging. Inclusion within the disclosures
was non-random due to the focus on large defaulters. A reduced-form relationship
between legal enforcement and disclosure thus suﬀers from an omitted-variable bias.
I propose an empirical strategy to overcome this challenge that relies on the following
feature of the disclosures: only a subset of borrowers’ defaults was disclosed. Borrowers thus had some defaults aﬀected by the disclosures but not others. As a result,
38

See also Mint (2012) for more on corruption in this context.
This firm, namely Kemrock Industries and Exports, is one of the defaulters that was disclosed
by this group. It was the 13th largest defaulter at this time.
39
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I compare the legal enforcement of banks whose loans to a particular borrower were
disclosed relative to other banks whose loans to the same past-due borrower were not
disclosed.
I have three main findings. First, I show that exposing defaulters’ identities and
past-due loan amounts increases banks’ propensity to seek legal action against pastdue borrowers: the probability of legal enforcement increased by 10 percentage points.
As other banks’ information sets were unaﬀected, this eﬀect derives from this information becoming known to the public, not to other banks. Second, most of this
eﬀect stems from an initial threat to expose these borrowers. Lastly, lenders targeted
borrowers that could likely have avoided their default. Overall, I argue that these
results are consistent with a desire to minimize the appearance of corruption that
could follow disclosure.
This paper connects to several areas of the literature. First, it relates to the
literature on government influence in banking. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2002) highlight that politicians may distort lending to capture private benefits.40 A variety of empirical studies provide evidence of this influence: Khwaja
and Mian (2005) show that politically-connected borrowers get more credit from
government-owned banks, despite their higher default rates. Sapienza (2004) shows
that government-owned banks charge lower interest rates than private banks to similar firms. Carvalho (2014), Dinç (2005), and Sapienza (2004) show that elections can
also influence lending terms.
This literature clearly demonstrates the government’s influence on the allocation of
capital. My paper diﬀers along two dimensions. First, I study potential government
influence beyond the loan origination phase. The literature, by contrast, focuses
on politicians’ influence over banks at loan origination. Second, I do not measure
40

Private benefits could arise directly from bribery or also from the non-pecuniary value of helping
friends and family, among other sources. Fisman, Schulz, and Vig (2014) show that Indian politicians
do use their power for wealth accumulation.
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any direct eﬀect of government influence on legal enforcement. Rather, I examine
whether disclosure counteracts a pre-existing impact of politicians on banks. Despite
the strong evidence of government influence in finance, we know very little about
how to remedy these problems (Khwaja and Mian (2011)). My paper suggests one
approach: public disclosure of defaulters.
As such, my paper connects to the studies on how to reduce corruption in banking. Existing studies find information sharing and disclosure to be important (Barth
et al. (2009), Beck et al. (2006)). Additionally, by showing that the distribution
of information influences legal enforcement, my paper contributes to the broader
literature on credit information sharing. This literature shows that by reducing information asymmetries, information sharing can reduce defaults and increase bank
lending (Pagano and Jappelli (1993), Jappelli and Pagano (2002)). It can also discipline borrower repayment (Brown and Zehnder (2007), Padilla and Pagano (1997,
2000)). Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2011), however, show that public information can exacerbate coordination problems and, thereby, increase the incidence of
financial distress. Nonetheless, these studies, including Barth et al. (2009), focus
specifically on exchanging information across lenders.
My paper diﬀers as I study a disclosure that made borrowers’ defaults public,
but left banks’ information about past-due borrowers unchanged. Consequently, a
decrease in defaults in my setting would arise through legal recovery of pre-existing
defaults or borrowers avoiding default, not through better loan targeting as in the
existing literature. As such, my paper relates to studies of how public disclosure
impacts bank risk-taking (Cordella and Yeyati (1998), Nier and Baumann (2006)).
Nonetheless, while the disclosures that I study may signal risk-taking, I do not consider it directly. Relatedly, Houston et al. (2010) finds that information sharing
reduces bank risk-taking, but this study also considers information sharing across
lenders. By highlighting the eﬀect of a leak of confidential information, my paper is
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related to Dang et al. (2017), which studies the importance of opacity in banking.
My paper also builds on the literature on the media’s influence on firm behavior.
The media can influence firm outcomes through its ability to draw attention to issues and through its influence on reputation formation. Several studies focus on the
media’s impact specifically in the context of finance. Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales
(2008) show that media coverage can reduce corporate governance violations. Liu
and McConnell (2013) show that the media can influence which projects firms adopt.
Fang and Peress (2009) find that the media can influence stock prices by expanding the dissemination of news. My papers focus on activism and its impact on firm
behavior is related to Harrison and Scorse (2010).
The most closely related studies are Houston, Lin, and Ma (2011) and Ho et al.
(2016). These papers highlight the media’s beneficial role in reducing corruption and
improving the functioning of government-owned banks. My paper contrasts with these
studies by highlighting the impact of a specific disclosure and the channel through
which it likely operates. My paper indicates that how lenders respond to public disclosure is potentially quite important: lenders’ relative focus on non-strategic lawsuits
suggest they may have forgone benefits provided by the political system under the
additional media scrutiny. My results also show that how disclosure via the media
is structured is important as the original disclosure threat accounted for most of the
overall eﬀect.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides institutional background
and discusses the disclosure that I study. Section 2.3 introduces the data. Section
2.4 explains my research design. Section 2.5 presents the results.
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2.2 Institutional Background
I quantify the relationship between confidentiality and contract enforcement. Specifically, I examine whether publicly exposing defaulters’ identities and past-due loan
amounts makes their lenders more likely to pursue loan recovery through the legal
system. The disclosure that I study, which Section 2.2.1 discusses, followed a large
increase in non-performing loans within India. Figure 10 illustrates this growth. It
plots non-performing loans, which are loans that exceed 90 days past-due, between
2010 and 2013. The solid line captures this growth for banks that are partly-owned
by the Indian government, called public-sector banks, and the dashed line reflects India’s domestic private banks.41 Non-performing loans are measured relative to total
loan advances.
Figure 10 displays a large increase in non-performing loans among public-sector
banks. While public-sector banks’ non-performing loans were only slightly above two
percent in 2010, they increased significantly to over 3.5 percent by 2013. Figure 10
also shows that this default growth was, however, not shared by India’s domestic
private banks. Domestic private banks’ non-performing loans declined between 2010
and 2013, from approximately three percent to under two percent.42 At the aggregatelevel, public-sector banks’ non-performing loans nearly tripled over this period. As
they account for over 70 percent of the banking system’s assets, e.g. see Reserve Bank
of India (2014), this pattern of non-performing loan growth reflects a large aggregate
increase in defaults within India.
Figure 10 nonetheless understates India’s non-performing loan problem. Beyond
the past-due loans it captures, Indian banks actively reduce past-due loans from
appearing on their balance sheets through write-oﬀs and loan restructurings (Times
41
42

Table A.5 provides a list of India’s public-sector banks.
Figure A.5, which also includes foreign banks, presents this figure over a long time horizon.
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Figure 10: Non-Performing Loans in India’s Commercial Banks
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of India (2013b)). The growth in “problematic” loans, defined as non-performing
loans and restructured loans, provides a more complete picture. At over six percent
of advances in 2011, which is over twice as large as the raw non-performing loan
figure, problematic loans rose to nearly 9.5 percent by 2013 (Bloomberg (2016)).
Restructuring past-due loans is clearly quite common within India.43 One explanation
for these changes is that India’s slower growth and rising interest rates decreased
borrowers’ ability to service their debts (Economist (2011), Mint (2013)). Sectoral
shocks in the textile as well as iron and steel industries have also been proposed as
important causes (Business Standard (2013a)).
Figure A.7 explores sectoral shocks’ relevance during this period. It shows newly
approved restructuring cases within India’s Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR)
mechanism between 2011 and 2013. The CDR is an institutional mechanism designed
43

Figure A.6 also shows the increase in write-oﬀs among public-sector banks.
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to facilitate syndicated corporate debt restructurings.44 Typically, CDR cases result
in a longer repayment period and lower interest rates (Mint (2013)). This chart shows
a rise in total restructurings in 2012, which was accompanied by a marked increase in
restructuring among the textile as well as iron and steel industries.45 State Bank of
India, which is India’s largest public-sector bank, asserted that these industries drove
their non-performing loan growth (Business Standard (2013a)).
These explanations cannot, however, account for the default growth’s concentration in public-sector banks. A bank employee association, which made the disclosures
that I study in this paper, claims that a “nexus” between banks, politicians, and
borrowers is involved (AIEBA (2013); Business Standard (2014)). Their assertion
echoes the view that politicians’ private incentives may distort bank lending decisions (e.g., see Shleifer and Vishny (1994), La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2002), among others). Numerous studies provide empirical evidence from around
the world: Government banks lend more to politically connected borrowers that also
have higher default rates (Khwaja and Mian (2005)) and charge lower interest rates
than private banks to similar firms (Sapienza (2004)). Elections can also influence
lending terms (Sapienza (2004), Dinç (2005), Carvalho (2014)).
The concentration of defaults in public-sector banks is consistent with a negative
impact of government ownership. Table 11 highlights the ownership stakes held by the
Indian government. It shows that the government owns, on average, over 65 percent
of public-sector banks’ equity. Across these banks, this ownership varies from a lower
bound of 55 percent, which is above the government mandate of at least 51 percent,
to upwards of 85 percent. Public-sector banks’ remaining equity is primarily allocated
across Indian banks, the public, and foreign investors who own 12, 8, and 8 percent,
respectively.46 Foreign ownership varies from one percent up to 18 percent, which is
44

More information is available at: http://www.cdrindia.org/aboutus.htm.
The value of new restructuring cases show a similar increase, e.g. see Figure A.8.
46
Figure A.9 highlights the overall ownership pattern of public-sector banks. Table A.6 details
45
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slightly below the Reserve Bank of India’s foreign ownership cap of 20 percent.47
Table 11: Summary of India’s Public-Sector Banks
Obs.
(1)

Mean
(2)

(3)

Min
(4)

50th
(5)

Max
(6)

Bank ownership:
Government ownership
Bank ownership
Individual ownership
Foreign ownership
Capital infusions

21
21
21
21
21

66.49
0.12
0.08
0.08
0.02

10.34
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.02

55.02
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00

64.11
0.12
0.07
0.08
0.016

85.31
0.26
0.21
0.18
0.07

Loan portfolio:
Sensitive-sector loans
Public-sector loans
Capital adequacy ratio
Secured by tangible assets
Covered by govt. guarantee
Unsecured loans
Past-due loans
Past-due loan growth

21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21

0.14
0.12
12.23
0.79
0.07
0.13
0.03
0.51

0.04
0.05
0.86
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.01
0.41

0.08
0.05
11.02
0.64
0.00
0.06
0.01
-0.12

0.13
0.11
12.33
0.80
0.06
0.13
0.03
0.52

0.21
0.25
14.15
0.92
0.21
0.21
0.05
1.49

Debt restructuring:
Restructurings
Standard restructurings
Doubtful restructurings

21
21
21

0.08
0.07
0.004

0.02
0.02
0.003

0.04
0.03
0.00

0.07
0.07
0.003

0.13
0.12
0.01

Beyond direct control, government influence can also arise from recapitalizations.
Table 11 summarizes recapitalizations of public-sector banks by the Indian government between 2010 and 2013. Capital infusions measures the capital flowing from
the government relative to banks’ asset growth over the same period. It shows that
recapitalizations were about two percent of asset growth, on average, with this figure
varying upwards to seven percent. Recapitalizations can help expand lending, but
they are viewed as a means to fix problems due to public-sector banks’ risk-taking
how the ownership categories are constructed.
47
Reserve Bank of India (2014) discusses regulatory restrictions on ownership that are listed above.
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in the past (Knowledge@Wharton (2010)). Recapitalizations are used in general,
e.g. see Mint (2012), and specifically during this period to help banks cope with
rising non-performing loans (Financial Times (2012)). Recapitalizations thus act as
a government safety net for these banks.
Nonetheless, the government’s influence on India’s default growth is unclear. Table
12 summarizes public-sector banks relative to all other commercial banks in India.
Each row reflects an OLS regression of the characteristics on a public-sector dummy
variable. While government guarantees may indirectly influence bank lending, Table
12 shows that public-sector banks’ loans are not more likely to be explicitly guaranteed
by the government. It also shows that public-sector banks hold similar portfolios
relative to other banks, as measured by sensitive-sector loans and by priority-sector
lending. Public-sector banks do, however, provide more loans to the public-sector.
This could partially account for the non-performing loans growth as some government
projects were delayed at this time due to both a slowing economy and government
red tape (Economist (2012)). However, the concentration of defaults in public-sector
banks is surprising as these banks’ secure more loans with collateral.
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Table 12: Public-Sector Banks Relative to Other Banks
Dependent variable:
Covered by govt. guarantees

(1)
-0.040

s.e.
(2)
(0.049)

Sensitive-sector loans

0.024

(0.028)

0.01

79

Real estate % of sensitive sector

0.053

(0.039)

0.03

65

Priority-sector loans

-0.014

(0.04)

0.00

79

Public-sector loans

0.105***

(0.008)

0.69

79

Secured by tangible assets

0.302***

(0.079)

0.16

79

Unsecured loans

-0.218***

(0.074)

0.10

79

Restructurings

0.066***

(0.007)

0.52

79

Standard restructurings

0.060***

(0.007)

0.49

79

Doubtful restructurings

0.003***

(0.001)

0.21

79

(14.23)

0.06

79

-31.547**
Capital adequacy ratio
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

R2
(3)
0.01

Obs.
(4)
79

Government influence in banking is nonetheless thought to be important within
India. Times of India (2014a) highlights that public-sector banks often come under
pressure from India’s finance ministry to restructure loans before they become pastdue. Mint (2012), also notes specific examples of government involvement to help
struggling public-sector enterprises. Most non-performing loans, it asserts, were destined to become past-due as they are granted for political purposes. It states that
politicians profit from this influence. Fishman, Schulz, and Vig (2014) show that
corruption is important in India more generally. Even if government influence is not
the primary reason for India’s non-performing loans, banks’ use of restructuring to
avoid recognizing defaults is problematic (Reuters (2012)). While Table 12 shows that
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restructuring of problematic loans is more common in public-sector banks, restructuring of healthy loans is too. As many restructured loans eventually turn bad, this
practice raises concerns (Bloomberg (2013), Mint (2013), Reuters (2012)). This is
compounded by Indian banks’ relatively low capital ratios relative to other countries.
Table 12 further shows that public-sector banks have even lower capital ratios than
other banks in India.

2.2.1 Disclosure of India’s Largest Defaulters
Section 2.2 highlighted the default growth within India’s public-sector banks. This
suggests a negative role played by the government ownership of India’s public-sector
banks. Yet if state influence discourages loan recovery, how can this eﬀect be mitigated
so that public-sector banks enforce loan contracts more frequently? One approach is
to publicly expose government-owned banks’ defaulters.
A group in India took this approach. Following this default growth, a labor group
sought to increase loan recovery by exposing the largest defaults within public-sector
banks. This group, called the All India Bank Employees Association (AIEBA), is
both the oldest and largest union of bank employees in India. Formed in 1946, it
represents over 500,000 employees across public, private, and foreign banks operating
in India (AIEBA (2013)). Beyond working to improve the welfare of its workers
as a labor union, it also seeks to improve the functioning of the banking system in
general.48 I focus exclusively on this group’s disclosure of largest commercial defaults
within India’s public-sector banks.
Their disclosure occurred in two stages. On December 3rd, 2013, AIEBA made
public an initial list containing borrower identities and past-due loan amounts associated with the largest 50 defaults overall within India’s public-sector banks (AIEBA
48

More detail on AIEBA’s history and operations is found at: http://www.aibea.in/.
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(2013)). Collectively, these 50 borrowers accounted for nearly 25 percent of total
non-performing loans (Indian Express (2013)). While in AIEBA’s possession, the underlying list was compiled by the Reserve Bank of India (Economic Times (2014b)).49
They disclosed the borrower’s identity and past-due loan amount for each default.
Noting that these defaults amounted to a “loot of public money”, AIEBA’s sought
to protect the public’s money within these banks (Business Standard (2013b)). To
help accomplish this goal, AIEBA made six specific demands to the Indian government: 1) disclose defaults exceeding Rs. 1 Crore, 2) make strategic default a crime,
3) investigate collusion among the government, banks, and borrowers, 4) modify existing laws to ensure quick loan recovery, 5) take “stringent” loan recovery measures,
and 6) do not incentivize corporate default.
Several media outlets wrote about this disclosure. The Business Standard, for
example, discussed the disclosure, highlighted AIEBA’s motive and demands, and
put the disclosure into the context of the large rise in non-performing loans within
India’s banking system (Business Standard (2013b)). While The Hindu (2013b) and
Indian Express (2013) noted some borrowers on the list, FirstPost (2013) made the
list of defaulters available online. Table 13 lists the ten largest defaulters in this
disclosure along with their default amounts.50 It highlights the range of borrowers
aﬀected, with the airline, jewelry, and gas industries, among others represented. It
also underscores the concern about strategic defaults among India’s top defaulters.
Both Electrotherm India’s and Zoom Developers’ lenders, for example, stated publicly
that these companies defaulted despite an ability to repay (Economic Times (2013c),
(Reuters (2012)).
49

This confidential list was “picked up by employees from RBI’s communications to banks” (Economic Times (2014a)).
50
Tables A.7 and A.8 contain the remaining firms.
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Table 13: The Largest Defaulters within India’s Public-Sector Banks
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Company Name
Kingfisher Airlines
Winsome Diamond & Jewellery
Electrotherm India
Zoom Developers
Sterling Biotech
S. Kumars Nationwide
Surya Vinayak Industries
Corporate Ispat Alloys
Forever Precious Jewellery & Dmnd.
Sterling Oil Resources

Default (in Rs. Crore)
2,673
2,660
2,211
1,810
1,732
1,692
1,446
1,360
1,254
1,197

AIEBA also threatened additional disclosure. While only initially exposing 50
borrowers, the underlying defaulter list contained more past-due borrowers. In particular, AIEBA coupled this initial disclosure with a threat to also disclose borrowers’
identities and past-due loan amounts of the largest 30 defaults in each public-sector
bank (Business Standard (2013b), Indian Express (2013), The Hindu (2013b)). This
threat aﬀected an additional 356 companies beyond those initially exposed. AIEBA
followed through on this threat and disclosed the full list on May 7th, 2014 (The
Hindu (2014a)). Several major media outlets wrote about the disclosures, including
those in India - e.g., the Economic Times (2014b), Business Standard (2013b), Business Standard (2014), Indian Express (2013) and The Hindu (2014a, 2014b) - and
abroad (Daily Mail (2014)). The Hindu (2014b) and Rediﬀ (2014) posted lists of
these defaulters on their websites.
These disclosures influenced the distribution of information as follows. Prior to the
disclosures, two variables determined who knew about a default: the default amount
and whether there was any lawsuit filed against the borrower. Borrower i’s default
on a loan of size s to bank b, for example, could be known privately by bank b, by all
banks, or publicly. Defaults were privately-known by the loan originator provided the
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default amount fell below certain Reserve Bank of India thresholds. These thresholds
varied by default type, with strategic defaults and non-strategic defaults requiring
disclosure across all banks provided they were more than Rs. 25 Lakh and Rs. 100
Lakh, respectively (Reserve Bank of India (2013)).
Beyond triggering disclosure across banks, the thresholds also determine when a
default is publicly disclosed. If a default amount exceeds the relevant Reserve Bank
of India threshold and the lender has initiated legal action against the borrower, then
the default must be publicly disclosed (Reserve Bank of India (2004)). This public
disclosure is managed by CIBIL, which provides a searchable database of these defaults on its website.51 Additionally, that lawsuits trigger public disclosure is noted in
the media (Indian Express (2013)). When a default exceeds any of these thresholds,
banks must report several variables, including: the past-due borrower’s name, the
branch location, the type of default (e.g., strategic or non-strategic), the firm’s directors, and the default amount. This information is circulated along with the name of
the bank that granted the loan.
Table 14 summarizes the informational environment prior to AIEBA’s disclosures.
The entries in Column 1 indicate who would know about a default given the default
size and enforcement actions, if any, of its lender. Column 2 captures the informational environment following AIEBA’s disclosures. Defaults are always privately
known to the loan originator provided the default amount is below the Reserve Bank
of India’s thresholds. For defaults above these thresholds, public disclosure is already
triggered once legal action is initiated against a borrower, as such AIEBA’s disclosure
only impacted defaults for which no legal action had yet to be initiated. Nonetheless,
banks were already informed about these defaults prior to AIEBA’s disclosure.
51

This information can be found at: https://www.transunioncibil.com/suit-filed-cases/suit-filedcases.
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Table 14: AIEBA’s Impact on Default Disclosure
Baseline

After intervention

(1)

(2)

Below RBI threshold:
No suit filed
Suit filed

Lender only
Lender only

Lender only
Lender only

Above RBI threshold:
No suit filed
Suit filed

Banks only
Publicly-known

Banks only
Publicly-known

Largest 30 defaults:
No suit filed
Suit filed

Banks only
Publicly-known

Publicly-known
Publicly-known

AIEBA only informed the public about the composition of banks’ defaults. The
Reserve Bank of India publishes bank-level data on non-performing loans each quarter. As a result, the level of these banks’ non-performing loans was already known.
Exposing defaulters’ identities and loan amounts thus matters by indirectly exposing borrowers’ repayment capacity. In conjunction with a lack of legal enforcement
against a past-due borrower, the ability to have avoided a default might signal corruption in the lending process. Recall that corruption was the stated reason why AIEBA
disclosed this information. Furthermore, the media has focused on large defaulters’
assets in the context of their default. In 2013, for example, Reuters highlighted Kemrock Industries and Exports’ ownership of a golf course and its chairman’s public
comments about the company’s large salaries despite defaulting on $250 million in
debt (Reuters (2013)).
Such corruption is costly to citizens for two reasons. First, it reduces economic
performance generally through capital misallocation.52 Second, it also directly reduces
the performance of public-sector banks, in which citizens hold a large stake.53 Nearly
52
53

Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that such costs can be substantial.
Shen and Lin (2012) highlight that political interference alone reduces government-owned banks’
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70 percent of India’s public sector banks are, for example, owned directly by the
government and, hence, indirectly by taxpayers. Additionally, nearly 70 percent of
deposits in India are uninsured (DICGC (2013)). Indian citizens clearly have a large
stake in the performance of these banks. The perception of corruption could, thus,
lead to a shift in deposits across banks or to citizens demanding better oversight
through the political system. Citizens’ ability to discipline bank management is,
however, hampered by a lack of information on loan defaulters.
Banks can influence the appearance of corruption that might arise from their
defaulters being exposed. To see why, note that the appearance of corruption stems
from two factors: a borrower’s ability to have avoided default and the lack of any
enforcement actions by its lender. Banks can thus reduce the appearance of corruption
by initiating legal enforcement. Pre-emptive legal enforcement could also further
decrease the appearance of corruption by reducing the prevalence of strategic defaults
exposed. Recall that AIEBA’s threat only impacted the largest 30 defaults within
each bank. If their disclosure were to be based on contemporaneous defaults, then preemptive legal enforcement can remove particular firms from the list to be disclosed.
While AIBEA was silent on the approach it would take, their disclosure in May 2014
was based on defaults as of 2013Q1.
In principle, pre-emptive legal enforcement could reflect strategic motives. For
example, banks may be reluctant to share information, which increases competition
through new entry and better loan targeting by competitors (Gehrig and Stenbacka
(2007), Pagano and Jappelli (1993)). Pre-emptive enforcement could reduce disclosure’s informativeness, by altering the composition of borrowers. Knowing that some
of their defaulters will be exposed, banks could accomplish this by pre-emptively
adjusting their legal enforcement decisions, provided the disclosure would actually
change their competitors’ information set. While this is a possibility in theory,
performance.
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AIEBA’s actions did not influence what banks knew about defaulters. Changes in
legal enforcement should, therefore, only arise because AIEBA informed the public
about these borrowers.
There was very limited legal enforcement against large commercial borrowers when
the disclosure occurred. Figure 11 illustrates this lack of legal enforcement. The yaxis corresponds to the probability of an outstanding lawsuit. The sample includes
the 406 borrowers that underlie AIEBA’s disclosures. While these borrowers account
for much of India’s non-performing loans, this figure shows that legal enforcement
was only initiated against a relatively small number of borrowers. It shows that as of
2013Q3, only 30 percent of these borrowers had cases filed against them. Borrowers
with outstanding lawsuits accounted for under 40 percent of the non-performing assets
of this sample. In essence, banks appear reluctant to use legal recovery options. This
is consistent with public-sector banks’ reputation for being soft on large borrowers
(Times of India (2014a)).
Limited legal enforcement at this time, however, need not reflect corruption.
Banks, of course, have other reasons to avoid legal action against a borrower. First,
lenders may seek initially to restructure the loan. This can be one step in preserving
the borrower as a going concern, which is optimal in some cases (Djankov, Hart,
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008)). Restructuring can also mitigate the need for more
regulatory capital and help to avoid a lengthy legal recovery process. Loan recovery through the legal system in India can, for example, take years. While there are
specialized courts to do so, called Debt Recovery Tribunals, years can pass before
initial arguments are even heard (Visaria (2009)). Borrowers can also delay court
proceedings (FirstPost (2015b), Times of India (2014a)). These delays erode lenders’
recovery rates - a feature of legal recovery not only within India, but also around the
world (Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008)).54 Relatedly, Gormley, Gupta,
54

Visaria (2009), Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria (2012), and Vig (2013), provide good
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Figure 11: Legal Enforcement Against Top Defaulters
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and Jha (2016) show that banks in India are less likely to pursue delinquent borrowers
when they face limited competition.
Second, a lack of legal enforcement may reflect lenders’ use of other recovery
options. Lenders in India can bypass the courts in some cases to directly recover
pledged assets. This is possible due to India’s Securitization and Reconstruction
of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, which
allows banks to recover collateral without a court order. The collateral can then be
sold through an auction. Vig (2013) highlights that the SARFAESI Act led to a
significant improvement in banks’ ability to collect on past-due borrowers. Despite
its potential, borrowers are often able to delay this recovery (Times of India (2014b)).
Additionally, lenders often only collateralize a small part of the overall loan (Economic
Times (2013c), FirstPost (2015b)).
discussions of the main aspects of debt enforcement in India.
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2.3 Data
I study the relationship between confidentiality and the legal enforcement of financial
contracts. To measure legal enforcement, I utilize a new dataset on lawsuits filed by
banks against their past-due borrowers. The dataset includes all lawsuits filed against
borrowers whose default amount exceeds Rs. 25 Lakhs in the case of strategic defaults
and Rs. 100 Lakhs for non-strategic defaults.55 This information was obtained from
Credit Information Bureau (India) Limited (CIBIL), the main credit information
bureau in India. Each observation contains several details about the specific case. For
example, the data contain the identity of both the past-due borrower and its lender,
the branch location associated with the loan, the type of default (e.g., strategic or nonstrategic), the names of the firm’s directors, and the loan value. To my knowledge,
this paper is the first to use this dataset.
Throughout the analysis, I rely on the list of defaulters from the disclosure in
May 2014. While this may suggest a selection problem, the composition of borrowers
would not have changed in response to enforcement changes following the threat but
before the actual disclosure. This is because the list only included borrowers that
were past-due as of 2013Q1 even though it was disclosed in 2014. One challenge does
arise from only observing the specific bank relationships included in the disclosure
threat. My empirical design requires that I know all bank relationships for each firm.
To overcome this problem, my results are based on publicly listed firms. In India,
it is customary for companies to disclose the identities of all their lenders at the
front of their financial statement. In the vast majority of cases, I used the financial
statement from 2013 to identify lenders. This date was chosen to capture bankborrower relationships immediately before AIEBA’s disclosures. When a company’s
2013 financial statement is unavailable, I use the most recent financial statement
55

A lakh is 100,000 Indian Rupees.
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relative to 2013. Of the 406 firms included in the disclosure, seventy firms were
publicly-listed. Each firm was then hand-merged to CIBIL’s suits filed database.
There is a total of 758 bank relationships across these listed firms.
Table 15 summarizes these listed borrowers. Firms in this sample had, on average, over ten lenders. Some firms had as many as 36 lenders, whereas others had only
two. The median firm had nine lenders. Over 25 percent of a firm’s bank relationships were typically aﬀected by AIEBA’s disclosures. Some firms had most of their
relationships aﬀected, e.g. the maximum is 71 percent. Consistent with public-sector
banks’ importance in India, most firms borrowed from public-sector banks. Nearly
80 percent of the average firm’s lenders were public-sector banks. Even among firms
with the least reliance on these banks, at least 25 percent of their lenders were still
public-sector banks.
Despite these firms being in default, very few banks had any legal action pending
against the borrower as of 2013. For example, only about five percent of relationships
had a lawsuit outstanding as of AIEBA’s disclosures. Even the median firm had zero
banks with legal action against it. Despite this low level of enforcement, 70 percent
of these firms had positive shareholders’ equity.
Table 15: Listed Top Defaulters’ Bank Relationships in 2013Q1
(1)

Mean
(2)

(3)

Min
(4)

50th
(5)

Max
(6)

70
70
70
70
70
70
67

10.83
0.26
0.76
0.05
0.02
0.05
0.70

7.43
0.18
0.20
0.15
0.08
0.14
0.46

2.00
0.03
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

9.00
0.17
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

36.00
0.71
1.00
0.71
0.57
0.71
1.00

N
No. of lenders
% of relationships aﬀected
% of lenders in public-sector
% of lenders with pre-existing suit
... | strategic default case
... | non-strategic case
1{Shareholders’ equity 0}

I rely on data from the Reserve Bank of India to summarize bank characteris78

tics. Finally, I also use data on debt restructurings through India’s Corporate Debt
Restructuring mechanism. This information includes the total number and value of
cases approved by quarter from Q2/2011 through Q3/2016. It also contains a sectoral
breakdown of the aggregate statistics at the quarterly-level.

2.4 Empirical Design
By virtue of focusing on the largest defaults, AIEBA’s disclosure was not randomly
assigned across firms. The main empirical challenge is then in isolating the disclosure’s eﬀect from other factors that are correlated with default size but also determine
banks’ propensity to use legal enforcement against past-due borrowers. While not randomized across defaults, exogenous variation in the disclosure is found by comparing
outcomes across diﬀerent bank relationships to any given borrower. Some bank relationships for a borrower, yet not others, could be aﬀected as only some defaults were
large enough to trigger inclusion in the disclosure.
A simple example illustrates my identification strategy. Consider a firm that
defaulted on two loans. One loan was granted by a bank for which the default amount
is suﬃciently large to be among the 30 largest defaults in the lender’s past-due loan
portfolio. The second loan was granted by a diﬀerent lender for which the loan is not
among this latter bank’s largest 30 defaults. In this case, AIEBA’s disclosures would
aﬀect the former but not the latter default. The disclosure’s eﬀect is thus found by
comparing whether the former bank initiates legal action against the borrower relative
to the second bank. This within-borrower comparison isolates the disclosure’s eﬀect
from other determinants of legal enforcement that would otherwise confound a simple
comparison of top versus non-top defaulters.
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I implement this comparison with the following diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences model:
yb,f,t = ↵ +

1 T opb,f

⇤ P ostt +

2 T opb,f

+ µf + µt + ✏b,f,t ,

(3)

where yf,b,t is an indicator that equals one if bank b has an outstanding lawsuit
filed against firm f as of quarter t, T opf,b is an indicator that equals one if firm f ’s
default with bank b is one of bank b’s largest 30 defaults, P ostt is an indicator that
equals one for quarters following 2013Q3, µf and µt are firm and quarter fixed eﬀects,
respectively, and ✏b,f,t is an error term. I cluster standard errors at the bank-borrower
level.
I use this model to assess whether exposing defaulters increased bank contract
enforcement. The coeﬃcient of interest is

1,

namely the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences

treatment eﬀect. When the outcome variable exhibits parallel trends during the pretreatment period and the disclosure is uncorrelated with other factors that could also
determine yf,b,t , the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences treatment eﬀect consistently estimates
the impact of disclosure on legal enforcement.
As AIEBA implemented its disclosures, this model can estimate either the eﬀect of
AIEBA’s threat to expose the largest defaulters or the combined eﬀect of this threat
along with the eventual disclosure. The sample period’s end date determines which
eﬀect is measured. This is due to the full list’s disclosure being preceded by the threat
made in December 2013. My main results, which are found in Table 17, are presented
both ways. The overall eﬀect of AIBEA’s actions is estimated using a sample period
ending in 2014Q4. The threat’s impact is found by ending the sample after 2014Q1
and excluding the 50 defaulters that were initially exposed in December 2013.
While T opb,f equals one for defaults aﬀected by the disclosure, it is zero under two
circumstances. First, T opb,f equals zero when firm f is past-due on its loan to bank
b but the default is not suﬃciently large to trigger inclusion into AIEBA’s disclosure.
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Second, it can also equal zero if firm f is not past-due on its loan to bank b. T opb,f
is defined in this manner as publicly listed borrowers do systematically report all
the banks that they are in default with. I overcome this data limitation by relying
on borrowers’ full list of bankers, which publicly-listed borrowers do systematically
disclose. The full banker list will naturally be associated with some loans in default
and, potentially, some that are not in default. As legal enforcement will not arise in
the absence of default, yb,f,t would always equal zero in such cases.
Defining T opb,f in this manner could create mechanical problem in a specific setting. To clarify the issue, reconsider the previous example. Now suppose, however,
that while the firm is in default on its loan with the former bank, it is not actually in
default on its loan with the latter bank. In this setting, the probability that the former bank initiates legal enforcement against the borrower relative to the latter bank
does not capture the appropriate counterfactual. This stems from the latter bank’s
lack of cause for legal enforcement as the loan is current. A mechanical relationship
could underlie

1

in this setting provided there is a general increase in the propensity

to pursue legal enforcement against past-due borrowers.
This possibility is unlikely to matter in practice. The above example is an extreme
case where the non-treated bank relationships, namely observations with T opb,f =
0, consist entirely of loans that are not in default. This would only arise if firms
concentrated all their defaults among the top 30 defaults in their lenders’ portfolios.
Nonetheless, a mechanical relationship will not arise provided some bank relationships
that are unaﬀected by the disclosure are nonetheless associated with loans that are
in default.
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Table 16: Example of Cranes Software’s Default

Lender:
Allahabad Bank
Bank of India
Canara Bank
IDBI Bank
State Bank of India
State Bank of Mysore
State Bank of Travencore

In default
as of 2013

Aﬀected by
disclosure

(1)

(2)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Default
year
(3)
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009

Any lawsuit
in 2013
(4)
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 16 highlights such an example. It lists Cranes Software’s bankers, which
is a publicly listed company in the top defaulter list. The list of bankers in Table
16 is the complete list disclosed in Cranes Software’s annual financial statement.
Column 1 shows that this firm was in default on loans from each of these banks.
Nonetheless, Column 2 shows that only the default with Bank of India was aﬀected
by AIEBA’s disclosure. Beyond this specific example, Section 2.5 highlights that
many unaﬀected bank relationships, again those with T opb,f = 0, had lawsuits filed
prior to the disclosure. This indicates that many of the unaﬀected relationships do
correspond to defaults and thus ameliorates concerns about how T opb,f is defined in
light of the underlying data limitation.
Table 16 also shows that some lenders are not using legal recovery options years
after the initial default. For example, Column 3 highlights that while Cranes Software
defaulted on all its loans in 2009, two of the lenders did not have a lawsuit filed as
of 2013. Only one of these defaults was aﬀected by the disclosure. The duration between default and legal enforcement, if any, is consistent with AIEBA’s assertion that
corruption between the government, banks, and companies partly underlies defaults
of large corporate borrowers. For example, an alternative explanation for a bank’s
decision to not pursue legal action against a defaulter is that there is value in loan
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restructuring. For the restructuring explanation to account for Crane Software’s case
would require this process to last nearly four years, which would seem surprising.

2.5 Results
Section 2.2 highlighted India’s non-performing loan growth. It also showed the concentration of this growth within India’s public-sector banks. Due to this default
growth, a bank employee association exposed the public-sector banks’ largest defaulters to help increase loan recovery. Their disclosure occurred in two stages. In
December 2013, they disclosed the largest 50 past-due borrowers and made a threat to
expose the largest 30 defaults within each public-sector bank. Following this threat,
they disclosed this broader list in May 2014. In each case, the disclosure included both
the defaulting company’s name and past-due loan amount. This group asserted that
corruption between the government, banks, and borrowers was behind the default
growth.
Section 2.2.1 illustrated that while this disclosure informed the public about these
composition of banks’ defaulters, it did not alter banks’ information set. By exposing
defaulters’ identities and past-due loan amounts, the disclosures facilitated assessing borrowers’ repayment capacity. It thus provided citizens a means to assess the
possibility of corruption, which could be signaled based on two conditions: a borrower’s ability to have avoided their default and the lack of any attempt by its lender
to recover a default. To reduce the appearance of corruption, lenders can increase
legal enforcement against past-due borrowers. This section thus explores two main
questions: First, did the disclosures increase legal action against defaulters? Second,
which borrowers were targeted and why?
Table 17 provides the main results. As AIBEA’s disclosures only aﬀected some
defaults for any given borrower, the identification strategy compares the enforce83

Table 17: Impact of Disclosure on Legal Enforcement
Variable:
Top * Post
Top
Post

Dependent
(1)
0.102***
(0.023)
-0.015
(0.009)
0.031***
(0.009)

Top * Threat period

variable: Probability of a lawsuit
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.102***
0.102***
(0.023)
(0.023)
-0.028**
-0.028**
-0.016
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.018)
0.031***
(0.010)
0.068**
(0.030)

p
Firm f.e.
Quarter f.e.
0.04
0.24
R2
6,468
6,468
Obs.
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

p
p

p
p

0.24
6,468

0.36
2,898

ment decisions of diﬀerent lenders to the same borrower before and after AIEBA’s
disclosures. The underlying model is thus a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences model. With
the data varying at the bank-borrower-level each quarter, the dependent variable is
an indicator that equals one when there is an outstanding lawsuit filed by bank b
against borrower f in quarter t. T op indicates bank relationships that were aﬀected
by the disclosure and P ost indicating quarters following 2013Q3. The coeﬃcient on
the interaction between T op and P ost, which corresponds to

1

in Equation 1, is

the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences treatment eﬀect. It measures AIEBA’s impact on legal
enforcement.
If exposing defaulters increases legal enforcement, then one expects a positive
coeﬃcient on the interaction of T op and P ost. The results confirm this hypothesis. Column 1 provides the result from a basic diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences specification.
Underlying this specification is a sample period that extends until 2014Q4. With a
sample period extending beyond May 2014, this column captures the combined effect of both AIBEA’s initial threat made in 2013Q4 and the subsequent disclosure in
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2014Q2. Column 1 indicates that the probability of legal enforcement increased by
10 percentage points due to AIEBA’s actions. This eﬀect is statistically significant.
With legal enforcement present against only five percent of bank relationships prior
to the disclosure, this result is also economically large.
Without firm fixed eﬀects, this result could arise for other reasons. It could,
for example, reflect a rise in asset values or a decrease in investment opportunities.
A decrease in investment opportunities reduces the value of keeping the firm as a
going concern and, thus, should increase the likelihood of seeking recovery through
the legal system. An increase in asset values boosts recovery rates and thus could
have a similar eﬀect. If either of these changes were correlated in time with AIEBA’s
disclosures and diﬀerentially aﬀected borrowers with more exposed defaults, then
Column 1 would also find a positive coeﬃcient even if the disclosures had no eﬀect
on legal enforcement.
Column 2 adds firm fixed eﬀects to ameliorate this concern. This modification
ensures that the result derives entirely from variation across diﬀerent lenders to the
same borrower. Column 2 shows that the result is unchanged relative to Column 1
following the inclusion of firm fixed eﬀects, thus indicating that the result reflects
AIEBA’s impact and not other economic forces such as those discussed above. Column 3 builds on the previous result once more by adding time fixed eﬀects to control
for aggregate shocks across quarters. This generalized diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences model
with time fixed eﬀects reflects the specification in Equation 1. The result is once again
unchanged as shown by Column 3.
Confidentiality thus reduces banks’ inclination to enforce financial contracts. These
results, however, capture the combined eﬀect of the threat and the eventual disclosure. Disclosure may highlight corruption, but the threat alone might account for
much of the observed eﬀect. Lenders’ pre-emptive enforcement following the threat
might have removed particular firms from subsequent disclosure. This stems from
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AIEBA’s choice to only disclose the largest 30 defaults within each bank and their silence regarding when the list would be constructed. A disclosure of contemporaneous
defaults would allow firms to be removed from the list to be disclosed in the presence
of advance notice, e.g. due to an explicit threat. Banks could thus potentially alter
the disclosure’s information content. Removing strategic defaulters is especially advantageous in reducing the perception of corruption. While AIEBA’s disclosures were
nonetheless based on defaults as of 2013Q1, banks could reasonably have expected
pre-emptive disclosure to remove firms due to the constructive ambiguity even though
such actions did not matter ex post.
Two sample restrictions facilitate a threat-based interpretation. First, I exclude
the 50 firms disclosed in conjunction with the threat. Of the 406 companies aﬀected
by AIBEA in any capacity, 356 were only aﬀected by the threat between 2013Q4
and 2014Q1. Second, I use a post-treatment period ending in 2014Q1. Following
this quarter, the 356 firms were exposed once the full list was made public. Column
4 of Table 17 reflects these modifications of the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimation.
T hreat period is the new post-treatment indicator that equals one following 2013Q3.
The coeﬃcient on T op and T hreatperiod indicates the threat’s eﬀect on legal enforcement. It shows that the threat increased the probability of legal enforcement by 6.8
percentage points. Consistent with pre-emptive enforcement’s potential importance,
the eﬀect accounts for nearly 70 percent of the combined eﬀect from Column 3.
Several steps are taken to verify that these results are causal. I initially confirm
that pre-existing diﬀerential trends in legal enforcement across top and non-top defaulters are not present prior to AIEBA’s initial disclosure. If present, the results
might simply capture pre-existing changes in legal enforcement between these two
groups of firms. Such diﬀerential trends could arise if, for example, policies established prior to 2013Q4 diﬀerentially encourage legal action against top defaulters. As
early as July 2013, the Reserve Bank of India had indeed encouraged banks to focus
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on recovery from top defaulters (Economic Times (2013b)). If the Reserve Bank of
India was successful in this regard, it might account for the results in Table 17.
Figure 12 examines this possibility. It plots the trends in legal enforcement across
top and non-top defaulters. The y-axis corresponds to an indicator variable that
equals one if a lawsuit is filed. Each line then captures the probability of legal action
against the past-due borrowers in each group. The solid and dashed lines reflect bank
relationships impacted and unaﬀected by AIEBA, respectively. Common trends are
clearly seen prior to 2013Q4. Consistent with a causal interpretation of my results,
the relative increase in legal enforcement for top defaulters only occurs after AIEBA’s
initial disclosure in December 2013.
The disclosures were also not, to my knowledge, timed with the introduction of
other policies that would diﬀerentially increase legal enforcement against top defaulters. India’s finance ministry was focusing on these top defaulters at this time (The
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Hindu (2013a)). However, their process commenced much earlier than AIEBA’s disclosures, with the finance ministry’s inquiry into top defaulters publicly-discussed in
the media as early as April, 2013 (Economic Times (2013a)). Enforcement would thus
have evolved similarly across these two groups in the absence of AIEBA’s disclosure,
thus a causal interpretation of my results is merited.
I also confirm that no particular firm drives my results. This possibility stems from
the small number of companies underlying my results, namely the 70 publicly-listed
companies in AIEBA’s disclosures. Despite this small sample of firms, my results are
based on variation at the bank-borrower-level. It might nonetheless be possible that
a single firm has a large influence over the results. I confirm that this is not the case
by estimating my results 70 times, each time excluding a diﬀerent firm. Figure 13
plots the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient estimates and confidence intervals that
result from this process. Specifically, it plots the robustness of the combined eﬀect,
which corresponds to Column 3 in Table 17. It shows that this result is not driven
by any single firm. Figure A.10 shows that the threat-based result found in Column
4 of Table 17 is also not driven by any particular firm.
While lenders responded to the disclosures, which borrowers did they target?
Given that exposure could signal corruption, one might expect legal enforcement to
be concentrated among strategic defaults. Strategic defaults for which lenders do
not seek loan recovery, arguably, have a visible appearance of government corruption.
Indeed, AIBEA put this issue at the forefront in making its initial disclosure by
asserting that corruption between the government, banks, and borrowers was behind
the default growth. They even used media attention to demand that the government
investigate such corruption (Business Standard (2013b)).
Table 18 explores this hypothesis. It examines AIEBA’s eﬀect by legal enforcement type. It considers two diﬀerent outcome variables: whether a lawsuit is filed
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against the borrower that also names it a strategic or, alternatively, non-strategic
defaulter. The results are based on the generalized diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences model
used previously. Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) use a dependent variable that equals one
when a non-strategic (strategic) default lawsuit is present against a borrower. The
overall eﬀect from both the threat and disclosure is presented across Columns 1 and
2, whereas Columns 3 and 4 focus only on the threat’s impact.
Column 1 in Table 18 indicates that AIEBA increased the probability of nonstrategic default lawsuits by 9 percentage points. This eﬀect is very similar to the
overall eﬀect on legal enforcement presented in Table 17. Column 2 of Table 18
reveals a much smaller eﬀect on strategic default lawsuits, with the combined eﬀect
increasing such cases by only three percent. While not reported, the interaction from
Columns 1 and 2 indicates that diﬀerence between the non-strategic and strategic
case results is statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.012). Column 3
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Table 18: Impact of Disclosure by Legal Enforcement Type

Variable:
Top * Post
Top * Threat period

Dependent variable: Probability of a ... lawsuit
NonNonStrategic
Strategic
strategic
strategic
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.089***
0.033***
(0.022)
(0.012)
0.058**
0.026*
(0.029)
(0.016)

p
p
Firm f.e.
p
p
Quarter f.e.
p
p
Top defaulter control
0.21
0.22
R2
6,468
6,468
Obs.
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

p
p
p

p
p
p

0.29
2,898

0.38
2,898

shows that the disclosure threat increased the probability of non-strategic suits by
nearly six percentage points, which is again similar to the result in Table 17. The
threat had no significant eﬀect on strategic default cases.
These results are surprising given the focus on corruption and, hence, the potential concern over strategic defaults. The results suggest that lenders increased
enforcement against the “wrong” type of borrower, namely those in default for nonstrategic reasons. This would be problematic, if true, as it would indicate that AIEBA
unintentionally increased the non-pecuniary cost of default to borrowers. An alternative explanation, however, is that lenders nonetheless increased enforcement against
strategic defaulters but chose not to name them as such in the lawsuit. Borrowers can
fight being labeled a strategic defaulter in court, e.g. as Kingfisher Airlines’ case, thus
indicating that such a designation need not always be present throughout the legal
course of what is, in fact, a strategic default (Business Standard (2015b), FirstPost
(2015b)). Banks might also have sought to avoid certifying borrowers’ unwillingness
to repay with such a label amid the scrutiny from the disclosure.
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0

0

No

0.073
(0.051)
0.15
1,392
p
p

Yes

(6)

No

Yes

Panel C: Probability of a strategic default lawsuit
0.003
0.041***
(0.022)
(0.014)
0.06
0.27
1,392
5,076
p
p
p
p

No

Panel B: Probability of a non-strategic default lawsuit
0.061
0.094***
(0.050)
(0.025)
0.15
0.24
1,392
5,076
p
p
p
p

Yes

(3)
(4)
(5)
Panel A: Probability of a lawsuit
0.106***
(0.026)
0.29
5,076
p
p

(2)

R2
Obs.
Firm and qtr. FEs
Top defaulter control
Shareholders’ equity 0
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Top * Post

R2
Obs.
Firm and qtr. FEs
Top defaulter control
Shareholders’ equity

Top * Post

R2
Obs.
Firm and qtr. FEs
Top defaulter control
Shareholders’ equity

Variable:
Top * Post

(1)

Table 19: Eﬀect on Legal Enforcement Based on Shareholders’ Equity

Table 19 helps shed light on this possibility. It examines the pattern of legal
enforcement across borrowers based on shareholders’ equity. While Table 18 suggests
that lenders targeted non-strategic defaulters, it does not diﬀerentiate across strategic
versus non-strategic defaults. To clarify those results, I examine whether lenders
primarily targeted borrowers with positive shareholders’ equity. Shareholders’ equity
provides a simple way to assess whether a borrower could have repaid its lenders.
Positive shareholders’ equity implies that the firm’s liquidation value alone could
repay all of a borrower’s liabilities. Defaulting with positive shareholders’ equity thus
strongly suggests strategic default.
Columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 19 examine AIEBA’s overall eﬀect across
borrowers. They show that lenders only increased legal enforcement against borrowers with positive shareholders’ equity. Once again examining borrowers based on
shareholders’ equity, Panels B and C examine the eﬀects on non-strategic and strategic default lawsuits, respectively. They both provide a similar result as in Panel A:
lenders only targeted borrowers that appear to have been able to avoid their default.
Overall, the results are more consistent with the alternative explanation for the results in Table 18: lenders targeted strategic defaults but chose not to label them as
such.
A few comments on the results are necessary. First, this paper considers only one
channel through which disclosure can increase loan recovery: encouraging banks to
pursue defaulters. Borrowers may repay to avoid negative publicity from these disclosures. As such, this additional channel could further increase loan recovery. Second,
the results only capture the eﬀects for publicly-listed borrowers. While a natural consequence considering data limitations, the eﬀects for listed borrowers could be larger
than for non-listed borrowers. The disclosures’ ability to facilitate an assessment of
borrowers’ repayment capacity depends partly on the presence of other information
such as borrower assets. While AIEBA only exposed borrowers’ names and past-due
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loan amounts, this additional information is available in listed borrowers’ financial
statements, but it is not available for non-listed borrowers.
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Figure A.1: Foreign Banks by Raw Bid Rank
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Note: This figure plots the percent of bids that were placed by foreign banks
based on the raw bid rank in each auction.
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Figure A.2: Other Measures of TAF Borrowing at the Stop-Out Rate
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Note: This figure plots various measures of treatment around the stop-out
rate. Panels A and B provide forward-looking measures of ever receiving
a Term Auction Facility loan and the natural log of Term Auction Facility
borrowing by the end of the quarter in which the auction was held, respectively. Panels C and D measure treatment within the entire quarter as an
indicator of ever receiving a Term Auction Facility loan and the natural log
of Term Auction Facility borrowing, respectively.
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Figure A.3: Fuzzy RDD Estimates with First-Order Polynomial
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Note: This figure plots the robustness of the main fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates, from Table 9, for diﬀerent bandwidths. The bandwidths
vary from +/- 3 bids around the stop-out rate to +/- 25 bids around the
stop-out rate. A first-order polynomial is used to control for bid rank.
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Figure A.4: Fuzzy RDD Estimates with Second-Order Polynomial
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Note: This figure plots the robustness of the main fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates, from Table 9, for diﬀerent bandwidths. The bandwidths
vary from +/- 3 bids around the stop-out rate to +/- 25 bids around the
stop-out rate. A second-order polynomial is used to control for bid rank.
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Figure A.5: Non-Performing Loans in India’s Banks (2008 - 2015)
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Figure A.6: Write-Oﬀs in India’s Commercial Banks (2008 - 2013)
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Figure A.7: New Corporate Debt Restructuring Mechanism Cases
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Figure A.8: Value of Corporate Debt Restructuring Mechanism Cases
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Figure A.9: Ownership Summary of India’s Commercial Banks
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Table A.1: Other Treatment Measures at the Stop-Out Rate

Variable
1{Bid Stop

out}

Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.
R2

1{Bid

Stop

272
0.43

out}

Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.
R2

Variable
1{Bid Stop
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.
R2

Panel A: Ln. of TAF borrowing by qtr. end
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
6.383***
6.275**
6.161***
5.664***
(1.495)
(2.692)
(1.230)
(1.921)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
272
0.43

Panel B: Receive a TAF
Optimal BW
(1)
(2)
0.291**
0.409**
(0.113)
(0.200)
First
Second
p
p
272
0.22

out}

272
0.23

706
0.54

706
0.54

loan during quarter
Full sample
(3)
(4)
0.249**
0.289*
(0.102)
(0.147)
Third
Fourth
p
p
705
0.36

705
0.36

Panel C: Ln. TAF borrowing during quarter
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
4.098**
4.578
3.594**
3.976*
(1.577)
(2.832)
(1.377)
(2.041)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
272
0.22

272
0.23

705
0.34

705
0.34

Note: This table summarizes the variation in diﬀerent treatment measures at the stop-out rate.
Panels A, B, and C provide estimates
of the jump in treatment when defined as the natural log of total
Term Auction Facility loans before the end of the quarter, an indicator for ever receiving a Term Auction Facility loan within the quarter, and the natural log of total Term Auction Facility loans within the
quarter, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table A.2: Fuzzy RDD Estimates Including a Past Borrower Control

Variable
1{Bid Stop

out}

F-test statistic

Variable
1{T AF by qtr. end}
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Past TAF loan in
qtr.
Obs.

Panel A: First stage, 1{T AF by qtr. end}
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.490***
0.544***
0.507***
0.489***
(0.093)
(0.160)
(0.080)
(0.120)
56.11

53.03

413.23

561.62

Panel B: IV estimates, 4Ln(Loan commitments)
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.119***
0.229***
0.126***
0.195***
(0.045)
(0.087)
(0.035)
(0.059)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
272

272

704

704

Note: This table presents fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates
of the impact of the Term Auction Facility on outstanding commitment
growth when controlling for past Term Auction Facility borrowing within
the quarter. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.

106

Table A.3: Fuzzy RDD Estimates with All Over-Subscribed Auctions

Variable
1{Bid Stop

out}

F-test statistic

Variable
1{T AF by qtr. end}
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.

Panel A: First stage
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.480***
0.587***
0.512***
0.486***
(0.088)
(0.152)
(0.080)
(0.120)
43.16

41.85

371.66

643.23

Panel B: IV estimates
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.114**
0.200***
0.111***
0.180***
(0.044)
(0.075)
(0.035)
(0.056)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
298

298

750

750

Note: This table presents fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates
of the impact of the Term Auction Facility on outstanding commitment
growth when also including the two auctions for 90-day maturity loans.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table A.4: Fuzzy RDD Estimates Using Raw Rank

Variable
1{Bid Stop

out}

F-test statistic

Variable
1{T AF by qtr. end}
Polynomial
Auction f.e.
Obs.

Panel A: First stage
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.474***
0.563***
0.529***
0.481***
(0.091)
(0.127)
(0.081)
(0.112)
77.22

76.03

439.87

206.14

Panel B: IV estimates
Optimal BW
Full sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.135***
0.185***
0.135***
0.177***
(0.040)
(0.065)
(0.032)
(0.052)
First
Second
Third
Fourth
p
p
p
p
268

268

704

704

Note: This table presents fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates of the impact of the Term Auction Facility on outstanding commitment growth using the raw bid rank each auction.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.
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Table A.5: List of Public Sector Banks in India

Institution
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur
State Bank of Hyderabad
State Bank of India
State Bank of Mysore
State Bank of Patiala
State Bank of Travancore
Allahbad Bank
Andhra Bank
Bank of Baroda
Bank of India
Bank of Maharashtra
Canara Bank
Central Bank of India
Corporation Bank
Dena Bank
Indian Bank
Indian Overseas Bank
Oriental Bank of Commerce
Punjab & Sind Bank
Punjab National Bank
Syndicate Bank
UCO Bank
Union Bank of India
United Bank of India
Vijaya Bank
IDBI Bank

Ownership Type
State Bank of India
State Bank of India
State Bank of India
State Bank of India
State Bank of India
State Bank of India
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Nationalized
Other

Notes: This table provides the list of public sector banks in
India as of 2013. Source: https://www.rbi.org.in/commonman/English/Scripts/BanksInIndia.aspx.

109

110

ind_prom_govt_equity
govt_equity

Prowess variable code:

frgn_promoters_equity
fii_equity
frgn_venture_cap_equity
non_inst_qfi_equity

ind_prom_indiv_huf_equity
non_inst_indiv_equity

Other ownership =
Total equity - government ownership - bank ownership - individual ownership - foreign investor ownership

Foreign investor ownership =
Shares held by foreign promoters +
Shares held by foreign institutional investors as non-promoters +
Shares held by foreign venture capital investors as non-promoters +
Shares held by qualified foreign non-instituitional investors

Shares held by individual investors

Individual ownership =
Shares held by Indian individuals and hindu undivided families as promoters +

Bank ownership =
Shares held by financial institutions and banks as promoters +
ind_prom_fi_banks_equity
Shares held by banks, fin. institutions, and insurance cos. as non-promoters banks_fi_insure_govt_equity

Variable:
Government ownership =
Shares held by central and state governments as promoters +
Shares held by central and state governments as non-promoters

Table A.6: Summary of Bank Ownership Variables

Table A.7: Remaining Defaulters in Initial Disclosure
Rank Company Name
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Varun Industries
Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceutical
Kemrock Industries & Export
Murli Industries & Exports
National Agricultural Co-operative
STCL
Surya Pharma
Zylog Systems
Pixion Media
Deccan Chronicle Holdings
K.S. Oil Resources
ICSA
Indian Technomac Co.
Century Communication
Moser Baer
PSL
ICSA
Lanco Hoskote Highway
Housing Development & Infra
MBS Jewellers
European Projects and Aviation
Leo Meridian Infra Projects
Pearl Studios
Educomp Infrastructure
Jain Infraprojects
KMP Expressway
Pradip Overseas
Rajat Pharma/Rajat Group
Bengal India Global Infrastructure
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Default
(in Rs. Crore)
1129
938
929
884
862
860
726
715
712
700
678
646
629
624
581
577
545
533
526
524
510
488
483
477
472
461
437
434
428

Table A.8: Remaining Defaulters in Initial Disclosure (Cont.)
Default
(in Rs. Crore)
Sterling SEZ & Infrastructure
408
Shah Alloyes
408
Shiv Vani Oil and Gas Exploration
406
Andhra Pradesh Rajiv Swagruha Corp. 385
Progressive Constructions
351
Delhi Airport Metro Express
346
Gwalior Jhansi Expressway
346
Alps Industries
338
Sterling Port
334
Abhijeet Ferrotech
333
Sujana Universal
330

Rank Company Name
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
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